Conclusion — Evaluating Future Strategies

Conclusion — Evaluating Future Strategies
1. Overview of Analysis
2. Closing Remarks

Conclusion — Evaluating Future Strategies

“To make progress, we must stop treating our opponents as our enemy. We are not enemies. We are Americans.”¹³⁹

President-elect Joe Biden

Overview of Analysis

Moving forward, I will assert that it is in the best interest of the United States government and its citizens to act swiftly and decisively in combating the growing threat of disinformation enabled by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. As we prepare to turn over the United States Presidency to a new administration, under President-elect Joe Biden and Vice President-elect Kamala Harris, I will consider proposals for President-elect Biden’s Administration, proposals for national security advancement, and proposals for the private sector. Given these areas of focus, I will proceed with providing a high-level proposal on how each given functional area should focus its efforts in combating disinformation over the coming years, with consideration to Russia and China.

Proposals for President-elect Biden’s Administration

As the Trump administration comes to an end and Americans prepare for the inauguration of President-elect Joe Biden, the next four years will be critical in terms of the evolution of U.S. relations with Russia and China. During the presidential campaign, President-elect Biden referred to China’s President as “a thug” during the tenth Democratic Debate in Charleston, South Carolina.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, President-elect Biden remains fairly vocal about his disapproval of

¹³⁹ Lauren Feiner, “Read Joe Biden’s First Speech as President-elect,” CNBC (CNBC, November 8, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/07/read-joe-biden-acceptance-speech-full-text.html.

¹⁴⁰ Bloomberg Politics, “Joe Biden Calls China’s Xi Jinping a ‘Thug,’” YouTube Video, YouTube, February 25, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DcMT_QZN2xk.

recent actions taken by Russian President Vladimir Putin in a variety of spaces from election interference to failure to abide by the Open Skies Treaty.¹⁴¹ Though President-elect Biden has agreed with President Trump’s decision to shift America’s focus from the Middle East to China and Russia, he appears to hold back on his plan of action, Biden stated, “… there are a number of other important priorities…”¹⁴²

I suggest that President-elect Biden takes a hard stance on both China and Russia from the very start of his time in office, in order to display a clear unwillingness to cooperate with states that undermine the United States and its domestic politics. In regards to China, President Trump waged a fairly intense trade war with the country that has accumulated over US$550 billion in tariffs applied to Chinese goods.¹⁴³ The tensions ignited by large tariff exchanges by both countries began to deescalate in early 2020, with the signing of the Phase One Trade Deal.¹⁴⁴ However, the consequential actions taken against Russia have been less direct in nature. President Trump has shown a willingness to impose sanctions on Russia’s elite and to target strategic military operations of the state but the President continues to delay other congressional sanctions against Russia and avoid placing the blame on the state for aggressive acts in the international community.¹⁴⁵ With this in mind, President-elect Biden has the opportunity to enter office with the intent of mending torn economic relations with China and implementing clearer rhetoric that shows disapproval for Russia’s recent actions. However, to best execute this agenda

¹⁴¹ RM Staff, “Joe Biden and Kamala Harris on Russia,” russiamatters.org (Russia Matters, November 9, 2020), https://russiamatters.org/analysis/joe-biden-and-kamala-harris-russia.

¹⁴² New York Times, “National Security Strategy - Foreign Policy,” New York Times, February 9, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/politics/2020-democrats-national-security-strategy-foreign-policy.htm l.

¹⁴³ China Briefing, “The US-China Trade War: A Timeline - China Briefing News,” China Briefing News (China Briefing News, August 25, 2020), https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-us-china-trade-war-a-timeline/.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid. *

¹⁴⁵ Natasha Turak, “Here’s Where Trump Has Been Tough on Russia — and Where He’s Backed down,” CNBC (CNBC, July 16, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/16/heres-where-trump-has-been-tough-on-russia–and-where-hes-backed-do.html.

of diplomacy, President-elect Biden will need to focus on improving America’s national security resources and processes to safeguard the U.S. from any potential future offensive actions taken by Russia or China during the course of this transition.

Proposals for National Security Advancements

With the public’s growing concern over discerning factual news from foreign disinformation aimed at obscuring their perceptions, it is necessary for the U.S. Government and national security officials to begin increasing transparency and the rate in which they share relevant information on this particular topic with the general public. For instance, there was the unfavorable and lengthy delay of the 2020 Worldwide Threat Assessment to the House Intelligence Committee from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).¹⁴⁶ While President Trump’s administration has remained silent on commenting on the topic, staffers have remarked that the report will not be released for the foreseeable future.¹⁴⁷ In the face of a highly contested 2020 Presidential Election, the general public deserved to know the threats that were prevalent especially with respect to foreign disinformation targeting American voters. The divide within the flow of information between the federal government and the public must be immediately amended, as people have the right to hear an overview of threats that affect their daily interaction with news and information. Increased communication would only be beneficial in restoring the public’s trust in our government and the democratic process.

Additionally, the United States government must continue to be proactive in establishing entities that can aid us to understand the threat of foreign disinformation and how we can improve existing national security agencies’ abilities to combat these threats. As we have seen

¹⁴⁶ John Walcott, “The Trump Administration Is Stalling an Intel Report That Warns the U.S. Isn’t Ready for a Global Pandemic,” Time (Time, March 9, 2020), https://time.com/5799765/intelligence-report-pandemic-dangers/.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

recently, there have been recommendations for the development of a Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center under the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).¹⁴⁸ The development of a center, similar to that which is listed above, could prove invaluable in increasing our nation’s cyber capabilities and would reinforce our commitment to combating the threat of disinformation. As suggested by Steven Bradley in a PCIO Policy Proposal, our government should look further into the formation of a federal commission that is responsible for establishing, “… guidelines to govern content moderation efforts by social platform operators…”¹⁴⁹ The federal government and national security agencies should also increase collaboration with the private sector in better managing the spread of disinformation domestically.

Proposals for the Private Sector

In the months leading up to the U.S. Presidential Election, President-elect Biden did not shy away from challenging the alleged lack of action taken when it comes to combating disinformation by social media giant, Facebook.¹⁵⁰ In a tweet, President-elect Biden called on his supporters to electronically sign an open letter that was intended for the co-founder and Chief Executive of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg.¹⁵¹ Within this letter, the Biden campaign coined the hashtag #movefastfixit and outlined four key asks: “[to] promote real news, not fake news; [to] quickly remove viral misinformation; [to] end the pre-election “lie” period; [and to] enforce

¹⁴⁸ Steven Bradley, “Securing the United States from Online Disinformation—A Whole-of-Society Approach,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 24, 2020), https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/08/24/securing-united-states-from-online-disinformation-whole-of-society-app roach-pub-82549.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid. *

¹⁵⁰ BLOOMBERG, “Biden Goes after Facebook on Handling of Disinformation,” Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles Times, June 11, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2020-06-11/biden-goes-after-facebook-on-handling-of-disinfor mation.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

voter suppression rules against everyone — even the President.”¹⁵² Additionally, the letter went on to assert the Biden Campaign’s belief that Facebook was blindly making itself vulnerable to disinformation campaigns launched by “foreign operatives” as seen in the 2016 election due to a lack of preemptive action with only five months remaining before the 2020 election.¹⁵³

However, one month prior to the election, Facebook stepped up and explicitly exercised its ability to slow misinformation and disinformation on a large scale, when it managed to suppress the further spread of a controversial New York Post article on Hunter Biden and a series of alleged emails.¹⁵⁴ Additionally, it is worth noting that Twitter had followed within Facebook’s actions by also removing the content and citing its “Hacked Materials Policy”.¹⁵⁵ Facebook went on to credit the timely response to its third-party-fact-checking program which has been under recent criticism as reports show that this entity had only reviewed 302 pieces of content in the month of January 2020.¹⁵⁶ While it proves to be a step in the right direction for combating this growing threat, many still believe that the response was not adequate. According to digital rights group Avaaz, the New York Post article still managed to receive 54,115,025 views and 2,164,601 interactions on Facebook.¹⁵⁷

Moving forward, we should adopt the Center for American Progress’s proposed concept of ‘circuit breakers’ across our social media platforms.158 The purpose of this feature would be to

¹⁵² 2020 Biden Presidential Campaign, “MoveFastFixIt,” Joe Biden for President: Official Campaign Website (Joe Biden for President: Official Campaign Website, 2020), https://joebiden.com/facebook/.

¹⁵³ *Ibid. *

¹⁵⁴Aaron Holmes Holmes and Paige Leskin, “Facebook and Twitter Are Choking the Spread of a Controversial New York Post Story about Hunter Biden after Questions Arise about Its Veracity and a Possible Disinformation Campaign,” Business Insider (Business Insider, October 14, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-hunter-biden-new-york-post-story-fact-checkers-2020-10.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ David Gilbert, “Facebook Failed Miserably in Its Attempt to Stop the Hunter Biden Story,” www.vice.com (Vice Media Group, October 23, 2020), https://www.vice.com/en/article/4ady3g/facebook-failed-miserably-in-its-attempt-to-stop-the-hunter-biden-story.

¹⁵⁸ Erin Simpson and Adam Conner, “Fighting Coronavirus Misinformation and Disinformation: Preventive Product Recommendations for Social Media Platforms,” Center for American Progress (Washington D.C.: Center for American Progress, August 18, 2020),

aid in the filtering of possible disinformation by temporarily preventing the platform’s algorithm to amplify the content in question.¹⁵⁹ As we have learned, the Facebook algorithm is more likely to suggest posts that appear to elicit a reaction, as it places an emphasis on showing posts that have larger amounts of likes, comments, and reactions.¹⁶⁰ With the assistance of this added feature, these platforms could potentially scale back the rate at which users are exposed to the content that is under review.¹⁶¹ Additionally, they could preemptive measures to warn users about the accuracy of a given post and guide them to more reliable sources.¹⁶²

Finally, I support the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s position that we have reached a point where we must begin to give a thought as to how to properly foster open discussions between our federal government and leading U.S. based social media companies.¹⁶³ With respect to the data privacy concerns of users across these platforms, I suggest the facilitation of publicly held discussions that aim to assess and design ways to share data with the necessary government agencies to assist in monitoring foreign disinformation campaigns that

https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/technology-policy/reports/2020/08/18/488714/fighting-coronavirus-misinformation-disinformation/?utm_campaign=The%20Interface&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Revue%20newsletter.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Facebook: Help Center, “What Kinds of Posts Will I See in News Feed on Facebook? | Facebook Help Center | Facebook,”* www.facebook.com* (Facebook, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/help/166738576721085.

¹⁶¹ Erin Simpson and Adam Conner, “Fighting Coronavirus Misinformation and Disinformation: Preventive Product Recommendations for Social Media Platforms,” Center for American Progress (Washington D.C.: Center for American Progress, August 18, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/technology-policy/reports/2020/08/18/488714/fighting-coronavirus-misinformation-disinformation/?utm_campaign=The%20Interface&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Revue%20newsletter.

¹⁶² Erin Simpson and Adam Conner, “Fighting Coronavirus Misinformation and Disinformation: Preventive Product Recommendations for Social Media Platforms,” Center for American Progress (Washington D.C.: Center for American Progress, August 18, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/technology-policy/reports/2020/08/18/488714/fighting-coronavirus-misinformation-disinformation/?utm_campaign=The%20Interface&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Revue%20newsletter.

¹⁶³ Andrew Eversden, “Why It’s Difficult to Share Info with Big Tech to Combat Election Misinformation,” Federal Times (Federal Times, October 8, 2019), https://www.federaltimes.com/congress/capitol-hill/2019/10/09/why-its-difficult-to-share-info-with-big-tech-to-combat-election-misinformation/.

threaten our national security and the credibility of our democracy.¹⁶⁴ With the threat of foreign disinformation increasing and the growth of our private sector similarly increasing, it is in the best interest of the United States government to tap into existing resources developed by the private sector to expedite the development of our federal defensive and offensive capabilities.

Closing Remarks

After reflecting on the three broad proposals for President-elect Biden and his administration, I would like to bring our attention to the underlying message within these areas of focus. Over the course of the past years, we have experienced a growing divide between the White House, the defense sector, and the private sector. The effects of this divide have been felt not only by our citizens but by the international community. This in return has made the U.S. vulnerable. However, regardless of the presidential administration, it is necessary to recognize that Russia and China are modernizing their offensive capabilities and agendas at an alarming rate. In the future, it will be imperative for Biden to establish fluidity among these three major areas of focus to defend against the growing threat of foreign disinformation that aims to delegitimize our democracy and disband our national unity.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid