VII. Alternative Solutions

Most economic sanctions have been too broad to successfully achieve their desired objectives.²³⁸ Therefore, activity-based sanctions, also known as “smart” or “targeted” sanctions, are the next rational step in motivating

²³¹. FATF Recommendations 2012 , supra note 13, at 20.

²³². See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Sanctions Sometimes Succeed: But No All-Purpose Cure, Cato Unbound (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2014/11/07/gary-clydehufbauer/sanctions-sometimes-succeed-no-all-purpose-cure#ftn4.

²³³. Smeets, supra note 2, at 9 (noting that economic sanctions against Iraq in 2009 presented ideal conditions for sanctions to work, but the subsequent military intervention undid the effort).

²³⁴. Id.

²³⁵. Doraev, supra note 1, at 384.

²³⁶. See Hufbauer, supra note 232.

²³⁷. Id.

²³⁸. Egle, supra note 28, at 40.

target countries to comply.²³⁹ One comprehensive study found that sanctions with narrow policy objectives, such as the release of hostage, were only effective half of the time, while sanctions directed to regime changes were only successful 30% of the time between 1970 and 2014.²⁴⁰ Instead of imposing broad nation-wide sanctions, U.N. smart sanctions have started to tack on criminal culpability to individual leaders.²⁴¹ These sanctions allow the U.N. to divert any unintended adverse effects away from the general public to specifically targeted individuals within the regime, with the intent to financially crippling the regime itself. ²⁴² The EU has also started to impose smart sanctions as a weapon against terrorism maintaining a “terrorist list” and strictly targeting individuals rather than enlisting unnecessarily broad sanctions that target the whole country.²⁴³

In the 1990s. the U.S. adopted the policy of imposing smart sanctions, which were later imposed against Bin Laden and Al Qaeda.²⁴⁴ The recent developments of U.S. sanctions policies expand the role of smart sanctions which target foreign officials or governmental functions without substantially impacting on overall economy and the people of the target state.²⁴⁵

Smart sanctions can theoretically be for effective, if they are combined with “deepened international cooperation and flexible approaches towards the revocability of coercive measures . . . . ” ²⁴⁶ The U.S. government can trace the financial “footprint” of terrorist networks, weapons proliferators, and drug traffickers by blacklisting them from accessing their funds.²⁴⁷ For this reason, smart sanctions offer a better alternative to nation-wide sanctions.

Unlike state-sponsored terrorism whose funding is vastly dependent on the state of the country’s economy,²⁴⁸ non-state terrorism usually operates on the margins of the economic activity and even entirely outside the country’s economy.²⁴⁹ Hence, the funding of non-state terrorism is less affected by nation-wide sanctions. Nation-wide sanctions can disrupt the economic development of the target country and thereby eliminating a number of economic

²³⁹. Id. at 8

²⁴⁰. See Hufbauer, supra note 232.

²⁴¹. Egle, supra note 28, at 37.

²⁴². Id.

²⁴³. Restrictive Measures, EUR. COMM’N (Mar, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/info/businesseconomy-euro/banking-and-finance/international-relations/restrictive-measures-sanctions_en (last visited Apr. 4, 2021).

²⁴⁴. Egle, supra note 28, at 39.

²⁴⁵. Hufbauer et al., supra note 69, at 134-141.

²⁴⁶. Doraev, supra note 1, at 416-417.

²⁴⁷. Peter L. Fitzgerald, Smarter Smart Sanctions, 26 PENN ST. INT.L. LAW REV. 37, 40 (2007).

²⁴⁸. Lobsinger, supra note 21, at 107.

²⁴⁹. Id. at 117-18.

opportunities its people.²⁵⁰ This in turn can foster a setting for dissatisfaction and hostility towards the sanction imposing country and encourage ideological extremism and terrorism.²⁵¹

The most appropriate time for the World Bank and similar institutions to start their development programs is when terror recruiters are searching in neighborhoods for new recruits.²⁵² Although these organizations have been addressing poverty from since their inception, preventing terrorism has not been a central focus of their programs.²⁵³

Nevertheless, eliminating poverty remains an important and vital solution to prevent terrorism. Antipoverty programs improve health, promote the sanctity of life, increase access to education, and eventually promotes democracy and new economic development opportunities.²⁵⁴ Although significant economic growth and political stability will not completely eliminate the risk of terrorism, the goal of any effective antiterrorism policy should prevent terrorism from being a feasible tool and a viable form of political expression.²⁵⁵

VII. Alternative Solutions

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