III. A LAYER-CONSCIOUS APPROACH TO INTERNET ACCESSIBILITY
The primary instrumental objective of applying disability law in any context is to address discrimination against people with disabilities by way of accessibility mandates—and the details of those mandates are critical. As Alex Geisinger and Michael Stein have described, the “ambit of protection” of disability law depends on the extent to which the “attendant [regulatory scheme] details precisely what . . . must be altered and how.”121 With the previous Part’s insights into questions of perspective in mind, I turn in this Part to augmenting the internal, place- and website-centric perspective of Internet accessibility with an external, layer-conscious view that contemplates what is necessary to ensure accessibility at and across each of the constituent layers of the Internet. This approach is consonant with the approach of Robin Malloy who, borrowing from the Internet-law concept of “network goods,” has argued for approaching inclusive design in the context of land use planning with an understanding of the network goods, services, businesses, housing, neighborhoods, and civil and cultural activities of cities.122
119. See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85 (2014).
120. See, e.g., ZITTRAIN, supra note 107, at 69–71; Grimmelmann & Ohm, supra note 107, at 926.
121. Alex C. Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, Expressive Law and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1061, 1073–74 (2016). Scholars have observed, however, that scholars and courts spent much of the first two decades of the ADA’s existence debating the scope of disabilities covered under the ADA, and the subsequent enactment of the ADA Amendments Act, which expanded the range of people who are protected by the ADA. BLANCK, supra note 5; Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1122 (2010). The appropriate scope of disability coverage is beyond the scope of this Article, though the broad view of Internet accessibility discussed in this Article naturally implies support for accessibility requirements across at least the full range of disabilities covered by the ADA and ADAAA.
122. ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAND USE LAW AND DISABILITY 197–200 (Peter Blanck & Robin Paul Malloy eds., 2015).
As the foregoing sections of this Article imply, Geisinger and Stein’s question of“what”—i.e., the relevant scope of Internet-enabled technology that is or must be covered by disability law—predominates this layer-conscious analysis. As this Part notes throughout, questions of the ultimate scope of Title III arise and must also be augmented by consideration of the role of other titles of the ADA, other disability laws, and other consumer protection laws,123 particularly the provisions of telecommunications law administered by the Federal Communications Commission.
Geisinger and Stein’s question of “how”—the technical details of the changes that accessibility requires, from screen reader compatibility to closed captions to audio description to intermediated relay services to plain-language versions of content— also enters the discussion to some degree,124 though their technical complexity leaves a complete exploration beyond the scope of this Article. While the Title III cases discussed above are primarily focused on the basic issue of screen reader compatibility with websites, what is required to make the whole Internet accessible to people with a range of disabilities raises a broader set of questions about how to address the accessibility of the wide variety of content, applications, networks, and devices that comprise the Internet. Each of these details—and their causal relationship with enabling people with disabilities to use the corresponding “place of public accommodation,” or not—fit neatly in what technology law scholars call“affordances” and “disaffordances” (i.e., how the relationship between a technology and its user facilitates or inhibits particular actions or behaviors by the user).125
Most importantly, though, this Part adds to the usual questions of “what” and“how” a significant focus the question of “who”—i.e., which people or entities bear the responsibility for accessibility mandates. While disability scholars and advocates often discuss accessibility in terms of a right for people with disabilities, to whom the corresponding duty belongs is a critical question.126 While the answer is often the easily identified corporate proprietor of a website in Title III cases, the layered nature of the Internet means that the internal perspective of using an application or experiencing content may obscure that there are multiple actors involved in its provision. Because the question of who bears responsibility for accessibility— whether from a legal, normative, or architectural perspective—is perhaps the most sweeping addition to the usual set of disability law questions, this Part considers the Internet’s layers in terms of the categorical actors most likely to be responsible for, and thus able to effectuate accessibility at, each layer of the stack.127
123. See generally Jonathan Lazar, The Potential Role of US Consumer Protection Laws in Improving Digital Accessibility for People with Disabilities, 22 U. PA.J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 185 (2019) (discussing the possible roles of consumer protection law).
124. Geisinger and Stein note by way of example that “in the context of a medical provider’s examination room, [Title III regulations] mandate[] exact details as to the height of examination tables, the amount of floor space (including wheelchair turning space), the width of doors, and appropriate examination tables, scales, radiographic equipment, lifts and gurneys, and the extent of staff training.” Geisinger & Stein, supra note 121.
125. See Julie Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 20.1 (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 12–13), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3162178 [https://perma.cc/GPN9-9LTD] (citing JAMES J. GIBSON, THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO VISUAL PERCEPTION 127–37 (1979)); see also Laurence Diver, Law as a User: Design, Affordance, and the Technological Mediation of Norms, 15 SCRIPTED 4 (2018), https://script-ed.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/diver.pdf?d=10222019 [https://perma.cc/4VN8-USDA]; Mireille Hildebrandt, Privacy as Protection of the Incomputable Self: From Agnostic to Agonistic Machine Learning, 19 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 2 & 2 n.2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3081776 [https://perma.cc/7N9P-2746].
126. Jurisprudence scholars discuss these types of corresponding rights and duties as Hohfeldian “correlatives.” See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, YALE FAC. SCHOLARSHIP SERIES 710, 717 (1917), https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5383&context=fss_papers[https://perma.cc/UCL5-VP68]. See generally Nikolai Lazarev, Hohfeld’s Analysis of Rights: An Essential Approach to a Conceptual and Practical Understanding of the Nature of Rights, 2005 MUR U.E.J.L., http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/2005/9.html#Right_T [https://perma.cc/7G86-JUFH] (“To say that X has a legal claim-right means that he is legally protected . . . against Y’s withholding of assistance with respect to X’s project Z. Conversely, Y, who is . . . required to provide assistance in connection with X’s project Z, is under a correlative duty to do so. The correlativity stipulation commands that if X has a claim-right against Y, this entails Y owing a duty to X . . . . He who has the right must be able to pinpoint another person with a correlative duty . . . in terms of . . . assistance.”); Pierre Schlag, How to Do Things with Hohfeld, 78 LAW &CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 200 (2015) (describing the relations of jural correlatives).
127. Jacqueline Lipton has described these actors as “Internet intermediaries” who intermediate and facilitate essentially all online experiences. Lipton, supra note 74, at 1342– 43.
Accordingly, this Part aims to disentangle the application and content layers, which are often conflated in Title III scholarship and litigation, by first exploring the distinction between individual websites and the broader World Wide Web. It then turns to the underappreciated role of web hosting applications in making website content accessible. Moving beyond the web, it turns to the set of dominant platforms that intermediate the provision of content in a variety of applications beyond the web.This Part closes with a discussion of accessibility considerations specific to Internet service providers at the network and physical layers and devices that comprise the so-called Internet of Things.
A. Disentangling Content and Application: Website vs. Web Accessibility
Superficially, Title III website cases are relatively simple matters of imposing straightforward regulations on easy-to-identify entities operating discrete, selfcontained applications. Most cases that successfully overcome Title III’s websitesas-places barrier require the sole proprietor of a self-contained website, such as a restaurant chain providing menu information128 or the ability to place delivery orders online,129 an online retail store selling goods,130 or a brick-and-mortar retail store providing a complementary website for its in-store services,131 to remediate a website’s structure to be compatible with screen reader software for users who are blind or visually impaired.132 The what, who, and how seem on first blush to be relatively simple for these websites—Title III compels their proprietors to make them accessible to blind people.
128. E.g., Markett v. Five Guys Enters. LLC, No. 17-cv-788, 2017 WL 5054568, at 1(S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2017).
129. E.g., Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, No. CV-16-06599, 2017 WL 1330216, at 1(C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2017), rev’d 913 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019).
130. E.g., Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 381, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).
131. E.g., Gorecki v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. CV-17-1131-JFW, 2017 WL 2957736, at 1 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2017); Gil v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2017); Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949–50 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
132. See also Feingold,* supra* note 51 (citing various settlement agreements involving integrated entities). But see Anderson v. Macy’s Inc., No. 2:12-CV-00556, 2012 WL 3155717, at 4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2012) (highlighting the complexity of litigation involving related corporate entities that are separately responsible for a company’s linked brick-and-mortar and online presences).
But even for sole-proprietor websites, the questions of who and how are more complex, viewed from an external perspective, than they might initially appear from an internal perspective of the user’s experience. While individual websites can be conceptualized as discrete applications, they can also be conceptualized collectively as the constituent content of the World Wide Web as an application. 133 While the web is decentralized in the sense that there is no single proprietor of every website, the web is centralized in the sense that websites use a common set of technologies, specified in standards developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and other standards-setting organizations. These standards include Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) and Cascading Style Sheets (CSS), which enable the design of the universal web browsers we use to view websites without the need for specialized software specific to individual websites.134
The accessibility of individual websites, then, is dependent not only on the architecture implemented by their proprietors, but on the centralized development of standards that facilitate accessibility. The W3C has developed voluntary guidelines for web accessibility, called the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG), which generally specify how websites can be developed in a way that is accessible to people with disabilities.135 The WCAG standards136 require that websites be:
133. The etymology of the World Wide Web traces back to Tim Berners-Lee’s original WorldWideWeb browser application. Tim Berners-Lee, The WorldWideWeb Browser, W3.ORG, https://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/WorldWideWeb.html [https://perma.cc/XFT9-JAJZ].
134 See generally Standards, W3C, https://www.w3.org/standards/ [https://perma.cc/RTS3-86Y6].
135. See generally LAZAR ET AL., supra note 6, at 60–65; *Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) Overview, *W3C, https://www.w3.org/WAI/standards-guidelines/wcag/[https://perma.cc/YL4W-MUG3]. Though their details are beyond the scope of this Article, the W3C has also developed additional guidelines for User Agents (UAAG) and Accessible Rich Internet Applications (ARIA).
136. For the most recent version of WCAG, see Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1, W3C (June 5, 2018), https://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG21/ [https://perma.cc/9LUJ-36MD], though many website accessibility cases refer to the previous version of the standard, Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0, W3C (Dec. 11, 2008), https://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG20/ [https://perma.cc/7CR2-QMT2].
Perceivable by users with disabilities137—for example, by providing text alternatives for images for users who are blind or visually impaired138 or avoiding the use of color contrasts that cannot be viewed by users who are colorblind;139
Operable by users with disabilities140—for example, by structuring the site to allow navigation with a keyboard so that users who are blind or visually impaired need not use a graphical input mechanism like a mouse141 and avoiding the use of flashing graphics that might cause seizures for users with epilepsy;142
Understandable by users with disabilities143—for example, by providing a mechanism for identifying definitions of unusual idioms and jargon that may pose difficulty to users with cognitive or intellectual disabilities;144 and
Robust in their compatibility with different assistive technologies.145 ***
The standards are divided into three levels of “conformance”—A, AA, and AAA— which include increasingly rigorous requirements.146
At the outset, WCAG’s governance raises an important disconnect: while the duty of website accessibility under U.S. law at least arguably falls on the proprietors of websites (qua places under Title III), the meaning of accessibility across the entire web is primarily set, if at all, by an international standards-setting organization that is not subject to Title III. That is, the accessibility obligations of websites at the content layer are dependent on standards independently developed for the web at the application layer by an entity, the W3C, which is never a party to Title III website accessibility litigation.147
137. Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.1 Recommendation § 1.0, W3C (June 5, 2018), https://www.w3.org/TR/2018/REC-WCAG21-20180605/#perceivable [https://perma.cc/J42V-Y53T].
138. Id. § 1.1.
139. Id. § 1.4.
140. Id. § 2.
141. Id. § 2.1.
142. Id. § 2.3.
143. Id. § 3.
144. Id. § 3.1.3.
145. Id. § 4.
146. Id. § 5.2.1.
147. No Title III cases to date have involved standards-setting bodies as defendants or intervenors, nor is it clear the circumstances under which such a case might arise.
The role of the WCAG standards has raised nontrivial concerns about what exactly is required to make a website legally accessible. For example, the Central District of Florida in Robles recently dismissed a complaint against Domino’s Pizza on due process grounds because of the lack of clarity on what standards would suffice for web accessibility148—though the holding was reversed149 and other courts have reached the opposite conclusion.150 The Robles district court cited the lack of resolution in the DOJ’s now-withdrawn rulemaking for website standards,151 which specifically raised (but did not resolve) the question of whether and which level of WCAG standards should be formally incorporated into the DOJ’s Title III regulations for websites.152 While advocates have cheered the reversal of Robles, the lack of clarity about the extent of WCAG’s applicability has hindered the viability and longevity of other Title III victories when questions arise about the standard of conduct that Title III imposes on websites—highly technical questions which generalist federal court judges seem poorly equipped to answer.153
Even if WCAG is ultimately able to be incorporated into DOJ’s rules and administered by federal courts, questions remain about its suitability. Peter Blanck has criticized reliance on WCAG and other standards alone as insufficient to serve the underlying goal of web “equality” for all people with disabilities, noting in particular that the approach of evaluating website compliance with WCAG standards emphasizes accessibility of website content for people with sensory disabilities at the expense of website usability for people with cognitive and intellectual disabilities.154 And WCAG has substantive accessibility shortcomings in the area of media accessibility; for example, its standards for the quality of closed captions are substantially less detailed than those of the FCC’s detailed regulations for closed captions on television programming.155
148. Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, No. CV-16-06599, 2017 WL 1330216, at 1, *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2017), rev’d, 913 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2019), *cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 122 (2019).
149. Domino’s Pizza, 913 F.3d at 902.
150.* E.g.*, Access Now, Inc. v. Blue Apron, LLC, No. 17-CV-116-JL, 2017 WL 5186354, at 9 (D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2017).
151. Robles, 2017 WL 1330216, at 5.
152. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information and Services of State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,460, 43,465 (proposed July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 36).
153. See, e.g., David Titmus, Viewers, ‘Queer Eye’ Star Bring Caption Quality Concerns to Netflix, VITAC.COM (July 3, 2018), https://www.vitac.com/viewers-queer-eye-star-bringcaption-quality-concerns-to-netflix/ [https://perma.cc/MUE3-36AN] (raising concerns about the quality of closed captions provided by Netflix under its Title III settlement with the National Association of the Deaf).
154. See BLANCK, supra note 5, at 45–52
155. Compare Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.1 Recommendation § 1.2, W3C
While a full grappling with the governance and substantive advantages and disadvantages of WCAG is beyond the scope of this Article, it suffices to note that in terms of allocating responsibility, focusing Title III and its attendant legal institutions, including the federal courts and the DOJ in a rulemaking and settlement capacity, on the content layer of the web may leave significant shortcomings in the contours of the accessibility of the web as an application. At most, Title III has supported the importation of WCAG into the ADA—but neither the courts nor DOJ have demonstrated a significant ability to interrogate the suitability of WCAG in serving Title III’s goals, to alter and augment the content of WCAG to serve the goal of website accessibility, or to provide sophisticated and muscular enforcement of its terms.156 However well a place-centric approach to Title III can establish that websites must be accessible, the external perspective of websites as content and the web as an application raises questions about the ability for that approach to address the substance of accessibility requirements at the application layer.
B. Allocating Responsibility on a Platform-Based Web
Setting aside the desire for robust and consistent substantive requirements for accessibility across the web as an application, the internal perspective fostered by Title III’s place centricity maintains a temptation to insist on holding individual websites wholly accountable for their accessibility failures. In terms of antidiscrimination theory, that website proprietors may be ignorant about what must be done to make their websites accessible is no less an economically driven choice— and a morally repugnant one—than a choice to knowingly and deliberately exclude people with disabilities from websites.157
But the layered architecture of the Internet—and the corresponding involvement of multiple entities in sculpting the user experience—will continue to raise questions about how, as a practical matter, to allocate responsibility and liability among these entities, even if the user is not actively aware that some of them exist and are playing a key role in intermediating the user’s experience.158 These questions are underscored by the reality that the majority of websites are not built from scratch by their proprietors, but instead by customizing elaborate commercial and open-source content management platforms like WordPress, Joomla, Drupal, Squarespace, and Shopify that abstract much of the underlying architecture to allow nontechnical proprietors to develop the content with limited or no knowledge of the code that is generated.159 If the web can be said to have any centralized points of operational responsibility at the application layer, they are the platforms that serve the majority of the world’s websites.
(June 6, 2018), https://www.w3.org/TR/2018/REC-WCAG21-20180605/#time-based-media[https://perma.cc/EP5X-TZ7T] (providing limited specificity about the provision of captions), with 47 C.F.R. § 79.1(j)(2) (2018) (providing detailed standards for accuracy, synchronicity, completeness, and placement of closed captions). See generally Closed Captioning of Video Programming, Telecommunications for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, Inc. Petition for Rulemaking, Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd. 2221 (2014), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-14-12A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY7G-M8E9] (implementing the closed captioning standards).
156. No Web Accessibility Regs? No Excuses, LAW OFF. LAINEY FEINGOLD (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.lflegal.com/2017/12/withdrawn-regs/ [https://perma.cc/39D6-J452].
157. See Bagenstos, supra note 14.
158. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 74, at 1342–43; cf. Martin Husovec, The Promises of Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement: Takedown or Staydown? Which Is Superior? And Why?, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53, 73–80 (2018) (discussing the economics of different models for imposing responsibility on users and intermediaries/platforms in the context of copyright infringement).
159. Of the top ten million websites, nearly fifty-five percent use a content management system. Usage of Content Management Systems, W3TECHS, https://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/content_management/all [https://perma.cc/D6MW-K5U3].
While some accessibility issues with websites hosted by these platforms are dependent on the code and content developed by their proprietors, such as adding alternate text tags to images for use by blind users or captions and other nonaural substitutes to audio content for users who are deaf or hard of hearing, many accessibility issues are rooted in the structure of the platforms themselves, the templates they provide users, and the tools they provide to author website content. The importance of authoring tools is so significant that W3C has developed a separate set of Authoring Tool Accessibility Guidelines (ATAG) aimed at platforms and other authoring tools.160 ATAG requires platforms to support the production of accessible content by:161
Providing authors with behavioral nudges and facilities to make the content of their websites accessible from the outset162 and remediate accessibility problems on existing websites.163
Making website templates and reusable content, such as stock photos, accessible by default.164
Ensuring that automatic authoring processes spit out accessible website code and preserve accessibility information, such as alternate text for images.165
Making authoring tools accessible by authors with disabilities166—a key step in related efforts to stop the proliferation of the false dichotomy between authors and people with disabilities.167
Promote the availability of accessibility features.168 ** 160. *Authoring Tool Accessibility Guidelines (ATAG) Overview, W3C, https://www.w3.org/WAI/standards-guidelines/atag/ [https://perma.cc/S583-XZ8L] (Sept. 24, 2015). See LAZAR ET AL., supra note 6, at 65–68 (discussing ATAG); ANGEL ANTKERS, SUSAN MILLER, SOPHIA GALLEHER, BLAKE E. REID & BRIANNA L. SCHOFIELD, AUTHORSHIP AND ACCESSIBILITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id=3254959 [https://perma.cc/9AN6-2AS3] (discussing the shortcomings and improvement of digital content authoring tools).
161. Authoring Tool Accessibility Guidelines (ATAG) 2, W3C (Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter ATAG], https://www.w3.org/TR/ATAG20/ [https://perma.cc/3AQS-B76S].
162. Id. §§ B.2.1–B.2.3.
163. Id. § B.3.
164. Id. §§ B.2.4–B.2.5.
165. Id. § B.1.
166. Id. § A.
167. See ANTKERS ET AL., supra note 160, at 8. See generally RESISTANCE AND HOPE: ESSAYS BY DISABLED PEOPLE (Alice Wong ed., 2018), https://disabilityvisibilityproject.com/resist/ [https://perma.cc/PND8-URZ4].
168. See ATAG, supra note 161, § B.4.1.
Despite the development of ATAG, accessibility issues with website hosting platforms remain significant. For example, in 2018, the lead accessibility designer of WordPress, which hosts more than a third of the world’s ten million most popular ,169 publicly resigned in protest because there were “so many accessibility issues” in Gutenberg, a newly developed version of WordPress’s website editor, that“most testers [examining accessibility and usability issues] refused to look at [it] again.”170 And other leading platforms include in their support documents explicit disclaimers of compliance with website accessibility laws like Title III171— effectively seeking to leverage contract law to shift the responsibility for accessibility, at least in a legal sense, to the proprietors of websites that use the platforms.
Though the accessibility on a majority of the world’s most popular websites is dependent in significant part on accessibility support of just half a dozen or fewer web hosting platforms, no significant litigation or settlement agreements have yet addressed website platforms. This is the case even though Title III litigation has undoubtedly targeted websites hosted on these platforms, rooted in problems caused by the platforms rather than the platform user/website proprietor.172
169. Id.
170. Rian Rietveld, I Have Resigned as the WordPress Accessibility Team Lead. Here Is Why., RIAN RIETVELD (Oct. 9, 2018), https://rianrietveld.com/2018/10/09/i-have-resigned-the-wordpress-accessibility-team/ [https://perma.cc/4LKP-XN3T] (emphasis in original).
171. See Making Your Squarespace Site More Accessible, SQUARESPACE, https://support.squarespace.com/hc/en-us/articles/215129127-Making-your-Squarespace-site-more-accessible [https://perma.cc/LR2W-VMEF] (last updated Apr. 8, 2019)(“Squarespace can’t provide advice about making your site compliant with specific web accessibility laws or acts.”); Accessibility Statement, JOOMLA!, https://www.joomla.org/accessibility-statement.html [https://perma.cc/XYX2-SLYJ] (“The Joomla! Project is not responsible for compliance with the standards of accessibility of applications and extensions created with and/or for the Joomla! CMS and Framework.”). But see Accessibility, DRUPAL, https://www.drupal.org/about/features/accessibility [https://perma.cc/Z97L-PSSD] (“We have committed to ensuring that all features of Drupal core conform with the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) guidelines.”); Accessibility Policy, SHOPIFY, https://www.shopify.com/accessibility/policy [https://perma.cc/5HP9-KC5F] (“Shopify is committed to maintaining an accessible environment for persons with disabilities.”).
172. See, e.g., HortonGroup, My Client Got Sued for ADA Compliance, How Compliant Are Your Websites?, SQUARESPACE (May 10, 2018, 9:28 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20190906023851/https://answers.squarespace.com/questions/218158/my-client-got-suedfor-ada-compliance-how-complian.html [https://perma.cc/RY5Q-G62G].
The lack of lawsuits against website hosting platforms likely is a dual function of Title III’s doctrinal focus on places and the associated internal perspective on the user experience that focus demands. That is, it is unclear to an ordinary user that a website’s inaccessibility stems from failures in the codebase of an underlying platform—a platform whose very existence may be unknown to the user. It may well be that Title III will be able to target website platforms as a doctrinal matter, but doing so will require a conception of Title III that goes beyond “places” and addresses the accessibility dimensions of the Internet’s infrastructure. 173
C. Application Accessibility Beyond the Web
Allocating responsibility among website proprietors and hosting platforms previews the broader challenge of addressing responsibility for accessibility across the diversity of non-web Internet applications. Since even the early days of the commercial Internet when the web dominated Internet use, the Internet has supported a significant quantity of non-web applications.174 Today, the most popular of these applications include video streaming, gaming, social media, shopping, file sharing, and instant messaging,175 the provision of which has come to be dominated by large“platform” companies such as Facebook, Google, Twitter, Netflix, and Amazon.176
173. Compare Earll v. Ebay, Inc., 599 F. App’x 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting Title III’s application to eBay’s auction platform), Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2012), Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115–16 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (same for Facebook’s social media platform), and Ouellette v. Viacom, No. CV 10-133- M-DWM-JCL, 2011 WL 1882780, at 4–5 (D. Mont. Mar. 31, 2011) (same for platforms hosted by Google, Myspace, etc.), with Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 573–74 (D. Vt. 2015), and Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D. Mass. 2012) (applying Title III to Netflix, a platform for video programming).
174. See supra Section II.B.
175. C.f., e.g., SANDVINE, THE GLOBAL INTERNET PHENOMENA REPORT 6 (2018), https://www.sandvine.com/hubfs/downloads/phenomena/2018-phenomena-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YWB8-22FN] (measuring application popularity in terms of traffic).
176. I use the terms “platforms” and “intermediaries” interchangeably here simply to refer to Internet-enabled applications that intermediate access to content. But Internet law scholars have explored in much more significant depth the definitions of the terms “platform,”“intermediary,” and related terms. E.g., Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 143 (2017) (describing platforms as “represent[ing] infrastructurebased strategies for introducing friction into networks”); Tarleton Gillespie, Platforms Are Not Intermediaries, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 198, 201 (2018) (describing the essential quality of platforms as offering moderation of content); Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of ‘Platforms’, 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 347 (2010) (examining discourse around the term “platform”); Lipton, supra note 74, at 1343–44 (defining an “Internet intermediary” as “any service provider that enables online interaction through either paid subscription or general availability to the public”); Frank Pasquale, Tech Platforms and the Knowledge Problem, II AM. AFFAIRS 3, 8 (2018) (characterizing the “largest, most successful firms” as “platforms [that] ran[k] and rat[e] other entities rather than directly providing goods and services”); Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information Platforms, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 3–4 (2002) (defining“information platforms” in terms of “network standards around which complementary products must be developed”); see also Ben Thompson, Defining Aggregators, STRATECHERY (Sept. 26, 2017), https://stratechery.com/2017/defining-aggregators/ [https://perma.cc/4YPG-27PD] (defining “aggregators” as “hav[ing] a direct relationship with users,” incurring zero marginal costs in serving users, and having by “[d]emand-driven [m]ulti-sided [n]etworks with [d]ecreasing [a]cquisition [c]osts”).
For accessibility purposes, a critical distinction between the web and these other applications is that the user interacts with the platform as an application, which in turn intermediates access to the platform’s content. That is, a user accessing a restaurant’s website may have no idea that the website is hosted on WordPress or Squarespace, and a user watching a video on Netflix or YouTube might not know the identity of the entity or person responsible for creating the video. And even where a user knows the identity of the person responsible for creating content—for example, the person posting personal photos to a social media platform such as Facebook or Instagram—accessibility problems are likely to pervade classes of media across millions or billions of users on a platform. From an internal perspective, then, the logical target of a Title III lawsuit might likely be the platform operating the application rather than the entity or person responsible for creating the content.
Of course, a threshold issue for holding these platforms directly accountable for accessibility is whether they can be subject to Title III in the first instance. The limited litigation targeting platforms under Title III has led to mixed results, with some courts dismissing cases on the predictable grounds that platforms do not constitute physical places.177 Even cases where courts have extended Title III liability to platform operators have focused on the portions of those applications accessible via their operators’ websites, 178 and it remains unclear whether Title III will be sufficiently flexible to extend to the components of platform applications provided via native smartphone, tablet, and television/set-top box applications not so easily amenable to Title III’s place metaphor.179 It is unclear the extent to which other applications, such as video games, will fit within Title III180 or regulations promulgated by the FCC.181
Questions of substance also abound. Just as legal requirements for making a website accessible to a user who is blind or visually impaired have been hashed out in significant depth,182 the FCC has grappled with the contours of making video programming183 and communications applications184 accessible to people with different disabilities. Moreover, as Peter Blanck has suggested, making the broad array of Internet applications accessible to people with cognitive and intellectual disabilities is substantially underexplored and remains a significant academic challenge in the area of Human-Computer Interface (HCI) design.185 Whether particular accessibility requirements ultimately will be sustained is not a given, either; the ADA’s fundamental alteration doctrine, which excludes from accessibility mandates requirements that would “fundamentally alter” the nature of the covered public accommodation, raises questions about what accessibility efforts might in fact be required by Title III.186
177. See supra note 173.
178. E.g., Netflix, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200.
179. But cf. Robles v. Domino’s Pizza LLC, No. CV 16-06599 SJO (SPx), 2017 WL 1330216, at 3–4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2017 ) (applying Title III to Domino’s Pizza’s mobile application); Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 567 (D. Vt. 2015) (referencing Scribd’s associated applications); Lainey Feingold, First Addendum to MLB Settlement Agreement, LAW OFF. LAINEY FEINGOLD (June 5, 2012), https://www.lflegal.com/2012/06/mlb-addendum/ [https://perma.cc/HE4U-8642] (describing a settlement agreement under a Title III case addressing the accessibility of Major League Baseball’s mobile applications). See generally John Gruber, Web Apps vs. Native Apps is Still a Thing, DARING FIREBALL (Apr. 30, 2013), https://daringfireball.net/2013/04/web_apps_native_apps [https://perma.cc/CS42-V6GH] (describing the transition away from websites towards delivery of content via dedicated mobile applications for platforms like Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android).
180. See, e.g., Stern v. Sony Corp. of Am., 459 F. App’x 609, 610–11 (9th Cir. 2011).
181. See 47 C.F.R. pt. 14 (2018). The Advanced Communications Services rules are discussed in further depth, see infra Sections III.D and III.E.
182. See supra Section III.A.
183. See 47 C.F.R. pt. 79 (2018) (laying out detailed regulations for closed captioning, audio description, accessibility of emergency programming, and accessibility features for TVs, computers, and other devices capable of playing back videos).
184. See generally 47 C.F.R. pt. 14.1(a) (2018). The FCC’s advanced communications services rules are discussed in further depth, see infra Sections III.D & III.E.
185. BLANCK, supra note 5; see also Lawrence O. Gostin & Lance Gable, The Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Global Perspective on the Application of Human Rights Principles to Mental Health, 63 MD. L. REV. 20 (2004) (discussing the international dimensions of the human rights of people with cognitive and intellectual disabilities).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012); see also PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (the leading fundamental alteration case, concluding that allowing a golfer with a disability to use a golf cart did not fundamentally alter the game of golf); BLANCK, supra note 5, at 131–36 (discussing in detail the intersection of Martin and fundamental alteration with web accessibility). Similar challenges have arisen in the context of the First Amendment, but many have been rejected by the courts. Compare, e.g., Greater L.A. Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. CNN, 742 F.3d 414, 430–32 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting First Amendment challenges to a closed captioning mandate, including that the mandate unlawfully compelled speech, constituted a prior restraint, and should be subject to strict scrutiny), Closed Captioning of Internet Protocol-Delivered Video Programming, Report and Order, 27 FCC Rcd. 787, 803– 04, (2012) [hereinafter IP Closed Captioning Order] (rejecting First Amendment challenges to the FCC’s closed captioning rules), and id. at 897 (statement of Commissioner Mignon L. Clyburn) (“[T]he promise of this rulemaking is much more than closed captioning for Internetdelivered content. Its true aim is equal access for all Americans to the video programming that forms the lifeblood of our civil discourse and the marketplace of ideas embodied in the First Amendment.”) (Jan. 13, 2012), with Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 801–06 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting the FCC’s implementation of video (audio) description rules on the grounds that the First Amendment implications required a narrow interpretation of the FCC’s authority under the Communications Act). See also Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297, 311 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rejecting in dicta arguments that the First Amendment either compels the addition of or bars the requirement of closed captions by television broadcasters); cf. Lawrence O. Gostin, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Corpus of AntiDiscrimination Law: A Force for Change in the Future of Public Health Regulation, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 89, 97–103 (1993) (noting in the context of health law the role of the ADA in augmenting the First Amendment rights of people with disabilities against overreach by public health authorities).
But setting aside these threshold questions of what and how leaves the perhaps more significant question of who187—that is, how should disability law allocate responsibility between platform companies and the entities responsible for creating content hosted by the platforms across a diverse array of arrangements?188 Platforms such as Netflix, which purchases the rights to movies, television shows, and other video programming via sophisticated commercial transactions, pose a different set of challenges than platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, eBay, Craigslist, and Wikipedia, which allow any user to submit content for intermediation at no direct cost.
187. Of course, robots may play an increasing role in the improvement of accessibility.
188. Paul Ohm and I have categorized these questions in terms of the difference between“Platform/User” regulations that hold users responsible for content they place on a platform, and “Platform/Platform” regulations that regulate platforms directly. Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has Software, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1692 (2016).
Even platforms that exercise a high degree of control over the content they distribute raise non-trivial questions of responsibility for accessibility. By way of example, Netflix is subject to extensive closed captioning requirements to provide equal access to people who are deaf or hard of hearing under a number of legal regimes. First, the FCC’s apparatus regulations require Netflix’s website and applications to support the display of closed captions provided with video programming on its website and mobile and set-top box applications.189 Second, the FCC’s IP closed captioning regulations require Netflix to provide closed captions themselves for any television programming with captions,190 which are required by the FCC for most television programming.191 And even Netflix’s original programming that has never been shown on television is subject to captioning obligations under a 2012 settlement agreement of Title III litigation with the National Association of the Deaf (NAD) that requires Netflix to caption all its content.192
Notwithstanding the array of closed captioning requirements facing Netflix, problems still arise with closed captions, including most recently a social media firestorm over the censorship in captions of curse words that were not bleeped out from the audio track in Netflix’s reboot of the series Queer Eye for the Straight Guy. 193 This is because Netflix, in many cases, does not create the closed captions for its programming, but relies on the providers of the video programming it distributes to provide closed captions.194 Netflix publicly describes an antagonistic relationship with these providers and threatens rejection of videos submitted with inferior or problematic closed captions.195
189. 47 C.F.R. § 79.103(a) (2018).
190. Id. § 79.4(a)(1)–(2), (b).
191. See id. § 79.1.
192. Landmark Precedent in NAD vs. Netflix, NAT’L ASS’N OF THE DEAF (June 19, 2012), https://www.nad.org/2012/06/19/landmark-precedent-in-nad-vs-netflix/ [https://perma.cc/BGL3-V7MM].
193. Ace Ratcliff, I Rely on Closed Captions to Enjoy a Show and I Don’t Appreciate Netflix’s Way of Censoring Them, SELF (July 10, 2018), https://www.self.com/story/queer-eye-netflix-closed-captions [https://perma.cc/E66K-KPEE].
194. Netflix Partner Help Ctr., Why Are Netflix’s Standards for Subtitles and Closed Captions So High?, NETFLIX, https://partnerhelp.netflixstudios.com/hc/en-us/articles/214969868-Why-are-Netflix-s-standards-for-Subtitles-and-Closed-Captions-so-high [https://perma.cc/4U3R-R3UU].
195. See id. Netflix even raised as a defense in the underlying litigation with NAD that it could not add captions to many of the videos that it distributed out of fear that doing so would
Addressing the allocation of responsibility among even sophisticated commercial providers and distributors of video programming is not a new issue for disability law outside the realm of Title III. For example, the FCC has struggled for more than two decades to apportion responsibility for the provision and quality of captions between the providers and distributors of video programming. The FCC’s initial rules adopted in the late 1990s placed all responsibility for captioning on video distributors on the thinking that distributors would leverage their contractual relationships to force video providers to include high-quality closed captions.196 But in 2016, the FCC reassigned responsibility for some parts of its captioning regulations to the providers of video programming, concluding that relying on contractual relationships had been ineffective and frequently resulted in missing or poor-quality captions that were primarily the fault of video programming providers.197
The sheer scale, economic configuration, and legal status of the largest Internet platforms, which are constructed to facilitate ordinary people sharing content at little or no cost, are almost certain to exacerbate these challenges for allocating responsibility. For example, Facebook, the leading social media platform, is used by more than two billion people each month,198 who collectively post almost two billion images to Facebook each day.199 More than a billion auctions are hosted on eBay at a given moment,200 and more than eighty million ads a month are posted to Craigslist.201 Users of YouTube, the leading video platform, now upload more than four hundred hours of video every minute. 202 Wikipedia’s volunteer editors have posted more than 5.9 million articles, including multiple terabytes of images, video, and other media.203
expose Netflix to liability for copyright infringement. Nat’l Ass’n for the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 202 (D. Mass. 2012); see also BLAKE E. REID, THIRD PARTY CAPTIONING AND COPYRIGHT (2014) (discussing the copyright dimensions of third-party captioning efforts). YouTube likewise requires video owners to opt in to use of its automatic captioning requirements, presumably over copyright concerns. See YouTube Help: Use Automatic Captioning, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6373554?hl=en [https://perma.cc/PC42-DU5Y]. Amazon also cited copyright issues raised by the Authors Guild in the context of failures to make Kindle e-book readers accessible in a dispute with the National Federation of the Blind. See generally Daniel B. Frye, Fighting for the Right to Read: A Campaign to Preserve Unlimited Access to the Text-to-Speech Feature of the Kindle 2, BRAILLE MONITOR (June 2009), https://nfb.org/sites/www.nfb.org/files/images/nfb/publications/bm/bm09/bm0906/bm090603.htm [https://perma.cc/TWC4-BTD2].
196. Closed Captioning & Video Description of Video Programming, Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 3272, 3286 (1997) (“Although we are placing the ultimate responsibility [for closed captioning] on program distributors, we expect that distributors will incorporate closed captioning requirements into their contracts with producers and owners, and that parties will negotiate for an efficient allocation of captioning responsibilities.”).
197. Closed Captioning of Video Programming, Second Report and Order, 31 FCC Rcd. 1469, 1480 (2016) (“[T]he responsibilities imposed by the contractual arrangements between [video distributors, producers, and owners] will not be as effective or efficient as direct responsibility on the part of video programmers to achieve compliance with the Commission’s new closed captioning quality obligations.”).
198. Third Quarter 2018 Results Conference Call Between Facebook Executives, Facebook, Inc. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2018/Q3/Q318-earnings-call-transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LS9-FVW7].
199. Shaomei Wu, Jeffrey Wieland, Omid Farivar, & Julie Schiller, Automatic Alt-text: Computer-Generated Image Descriptions for Blind Users on a Social Network Service (2017), in CSCW ’17 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017 ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK AND SOCIAL COMPUTING 1180 (2011).
200. Who We Are, EBAY.COM, https://www.ebayinc.com/our-company/who-we-are/ [https://perma.cc/7TZC-E8HP].
201. Factsheet, CRAIGSLIST.COM, https://web.archive.org/web/20160101050442/http://www.craigslist.org/about/factsheet (taken down as of Jan. 2, 2016, but available as of January 1, 2016).
202. Bree Brouwer, YouTube Now Gets Over 400 Hours of Content Uploaded Every Minute, TUBEFILTER (July 26, 2015), https://www.tubefilter.com/2015/07/26/youtube-400-hours-content-every-minute/ [https://perma.cc/843Z-8FU5] (quoting YouTube CEO Susan Wojcicki).
203. Wikipedia:Data Download, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Database_download [https://perma.cc/A656-EX2J].
As a result, disability law must grapple with how to allocate responsibility for accessibility between platforms and their users. The aforementioned principles of layer integrity and layer crossing minimization suggest targeting regulations at the layer of the stack where problems occur.204 These principles suggest that, at a minimum, disability law should intervene at the application layer to require platforms to make their interfaces accessible and to require the provision of authoring tools to enable users to make their content accessible.
Some of these problems are solved in principle by the FCC’s video player regulations,205 which require televisions, computers, laptops, set-top boxes, tablets, smartphones, and other devices to display closed captions206 and play back audio description and accessible emergency information207 Others are similarly addressed by the FCC’s advanced communications service (ACS) regulations,208 which require Voice over IP (VoIP), text messaging, and video conferencing209 services210 and equipment211 to be accessible.212 Others might be solved by interpreting the ADA to apply WCAG or similar standards to the interfaces of the applications and Authoring Tool Accessibility Guidelines (ATAG) or similar standards to the authoring and hosting mechanisms provided by platforms.213
204. See supra Section II.B.
205. 47 C.F.R. pt. 79, subpt. B (2018). See generally Accessible Emergency Information & Apparatus Requirements for Emergency Information & Video Description, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 28 FCC Rcd. 4871 (2013), updated by Second Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 30 FCC Rcd.5186 (2015) (describing in detail the FCC’s apparatus requirements for video (audio) description and accessible emergency information); Accessibility of User Interfaces & Video Programming Guides & Menus, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 28 FCC Rcd. 17,330 (2013), updated by Second Report and Order, Order on Reconsideration, and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 30 FCC Rcd. 13,914 (2015) (describing in detail accessibility requirements for user interfaces for video playback apparatus); Closed-Captioning of Internet Protocol-Delivered Video Programming, 27 FCC Rcd. 787, 838–59 (2012) (describing in detail the FCC’s apparatus requirements for closed captioning).
206. 47 C.F.R. §§ 79.101–103 (2018).
207. Id. §§ 79.105–79.106.
208. Id. pt. 14 (2018). See generally Implementation of Sections 716 & 717 of the Communications Act of 1934, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 FCC Rcd. 14,557 (2011) (describing in detail the commission’s ACS rules).
209. 47 U.S.C. § 153(1) (2012) (defining “advanced communications services” to include interconnected and non-interconnected VoIP, electronic messaging, and interoperable video conferencing services); 47 C.F.R. § 14.10(c) (2018) (same).
210. 47 C.F.R. § 14.21(a)(2) (2018) (requiring accessibility and usability for services).
211.* Id*. § 14.20(a)(1) (requiring accessibility and usability for equipment).
212. Id. § 14.21(b) (defining accessibility in terms of accessibility for people with various types of disabilities); see id. § 14.21(c) (defining usability). Where accessibility or usability is not achievable, vendors can alternatively provide compatibility with users’ devices, including TTYs, through a “bring your own device”-style provision. Id. § 14.20(a)(3) (allowing compatibility where accessibility or usability is not achievable); see also id. at § 14.21(d) (defining compatibility). In 2016, the FCC updated the TTY compatibility rules to allow vendors to substitute for TTY the use of Real-Time Text (RTT) technology. Id. at § 14.21(d)(5). See generally Transition from TTY to Real-Time Text Technology, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 31 FCC Rcd. 13568 (2016).
213. The DOJ’s withdrawn Title III website rulemaking, Accessibility of Web Information and Services of State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,460 (July 26, 2010), did not address WTAG. See supra Part I & notes 55–57. Some platforms have begun to address the provision of authoring tools for accessible content more robustly, but problems persist. See ANTKERS ET AL., supra note 160.
But what, then, about the accessibility of content itself—for example, theprovision of closed captions and audio descriptions for video, alternate text tags for images, transcripts for audio files such as podcasts, and plain-language versions of textual articles? Layer integrity and crossing minimization would suggest that these are problems that manifest at the content layer, and thus should be solved there by requiring platform users to make their content accessible to people with disabilities.
This insight is also supported by the prospect that platforms will invoke Section 230 of the Communications Act, which exempts platforms from being treated as the publisher or speaker of content they host for the purpose of defamation and other laws,214 as a defense against Title III claims that would make them responsible for the accessibility of content posted by their users, although Congress and Internet-law scholars have increasingly begun to debate the extent to which Section 230 should serve as a shield for platforms facilitating discrimination through the hosting of content.215 The Department of Justice has also unhelpfully set regulations that excuse public accommodations from “alter[ing] [their] inventory to include accessible or special goods,” including “Brailled versions of books, books on audio cassettes, [or] closed-captioned video tapes,”216 though courts have alternatively accepted and rejected the application of this regulation in the context of technology accessibility cases.217
214. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
215. Though a full treatment of the Section 230 literature is beyond the scope of this article, one exemplary criticism of Section 230 comes from Danielle Keats Citron and Benjamin Wittes, who argue that the goal of Section 230 “was not to give [private actors] immunity from liability for helping third parties abuse each other.” Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn’t Just Backpage: Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. TECH. L. REV. 453, 456–57 (2018).
216. 28 C.F.R. § 36.307(a), (c) (2018).
217. Compare Report and Recommendation Regarding Defendants’ Motion to Stay or Dismiss, No. 3:15-cv-30023-MGM, 2016 WL 3561622, at 11 (D. Mass. Feb. 9, 2016) (rejecting in a case under Title III of the ADA Harvard University’s invocation of Rule 36.307(a) and (c) as an excuse for leaving inaccessible content on its website), with Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, No. SACV 13-1387-DOC (RNBx), 2014 WL 1920751, at 10 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2014) (rejecting the application of Title III to Redbox’s streaming and physical video services by reference in part to Rule 36.307(a)), and Court Order, No. CV 09-7710 PA (FFMx), 2010 WL 8022226, at 3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (citing Rule 36.307(a) as an alternate basis for denying a Title III claim against Sony over the production of inaccessible video games).
However, Title III contains a barrier to mandating accessibility at the content layer itself. The undue burden limitation relieves places of public accommodation from accessibility mandates where compliance would result in an undue economic burden.218 Parallel to the fundamental alteration doctrine, undue burden is rooted in the notion that disability law should not achieve equal access to a public accommodation by forcing it out of existence and therefore leaving people with and without disabilities equally unable to access it.219
Undue burden features prominently in content accessibility primarily because adding accessibility features to content, including closed captions, video descriptions, text tags, and transcripts, can be nontrivially expensive relative to the cost of using a platform, access to which is often provided at no cost.220 While some platform users are sophisticated commercial entities who can easily afford to make their content accessible—and in some cases are required to do so under FCC regulations221—many are ordinary people uploading pictures and videos of pets and children, selling household items, and writing articles and posting media about areas of personal interest—all relatively frictionless and effectively transactions on modern platforms. Though the issue has not been litigated in the context of Title III, some platform users may argue that the imposition of a requirement that they caption or describe a personal video at some cost, which they would otherwise upload at no cost, would impose an undue burden.222
218. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
219. See Gregory S. Crespi, Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating “Undue Hardship” Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L.J. 1, 9, 15–18 (1990).
220. See Elisa Edelberg, How Much Does Audio Description Cost?, 3PLAYMEDIA (June 3, 2019), https://www.3playmedia.com/2017/04/14/how-much-does-audio-description-cost/[https://perma.cc/Y3RQ-UPM3]; Sofia Enamorado, How Much Does a Closed Caption Service Cost? (and Why Price Isn’t Everything), 3PLAYMEDIA (July 25, 2019), https://www.3playmedia.com/2019/02/08/how-much-does-closed-captioning-service-cost/ [https://perma.cc/9ZT6-CRVT]; Saul Hansell, Should YouTube Charge a Fee to Upload Video?, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (July 16, 2009, 12:43 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/should-youtube-charge-a-fee-to-upload-video/ [https://perma.cc/Y8AQ-8F6S].
221. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 79.4(b) (2018).
222. The FCC has dealt for more than two decades with a significant proliferation of undue burden waiver petitions filed by producers of broadcast television programming. E.g., Anglers for Christ Ministries, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 FCC Rcd. 14,941 (2011).
The question returns, then, to whether platforms might be compelled to make the content they host accessible. The question of undue burden aside,223 automation may provide a solution.224 Platforms and academic researchers are developing advanced algorithms to automatically generate captions for videos,225 alternate text descriptions for pictures,226 and even preliminary audio descriptions for video227 and dynamically generated plain-language versions of websites accessible to people with intellectual and cognitive disabilities,228 though significant quality problems persist with many of these techniques.229 Relatedly, significant advances in recognizing both statutory exceptions and limitations in copyright law230 and recognition by the courts231 and the U.S. Copyright Office232 of wide latitude to make copyrighted works accessible consistent with the doctrine of fair use have helped remove copyright barriers to third-party accessibility efforts,233 though questions remain about the extent to which third parties might be held responsible under the ADA or other disability laws for the creation of poor-quality remediation.234
223. On the flip side, the dynamic of at-scale accessibility raises the prospects of positive externalities, such as the use of closed captions for search engine optimization and ad targeting. While the familiar examples of closed captions in loud bars and quiet hospitals are widely known, the battle to capture the value of positive externalities of accessibility features is often contentious. See, e.g., Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 173– 74, 181 (2d Cir. 2018) (concluding that a media-monitoring service that indexed and enabled search of television clips at scale using closed-captioned text copied from broadcasts constituted copyright infringement).
224. In proposing this solution, I acknowledge that I risk violating “Felten’s Third Law”: “Given a difficult technology policy problem, lawyers will tend to seek technology solutions and technologists will tend to seek legal solutions,” rejecting “non-solutions in [their] own area[s]” in the hope that “there must be a solution lurking somewhere in the unexplored wilderness of the other area.” Ed Felten, A Free Internet, if We Can Keep It, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Jan. 28, 2010), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2010/01/28/free-Internet-if-we-can-keep-it/ [https://perma.cc/2YAQ-B2D3].
225. See, e.g., YouTube Help: Use Automatic Captioning, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6373554?hl=en [https://perma.cc/Z7YD-GVHP].
226. See Wu et al., supra note 199.
227. See S R Sreela & Sunam Mary Idicula, AIDGenS: An Automatic Image Description System Using Residual Neural Network, in 2018 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DATA SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING (ICDSE) (2018), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8527798 [https://perma.cc/D9PY-RY5M].
228. See generally CLAYTON LEWIS, IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN MACHINE LEARNING FOR PEOPLE WITH COGNITIVE DISABILITIES (2018), https://www.colemaninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/white-paper-coleman-version-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y768-X7DH].
229. For example, YouTube notes that “automatic captions might misrepresent the spoken content due to mispronunciations, accents, dialects, or background noise” and instructs users to “always review automatic captions and [manually] edit any parts that haven’t been properly transcribed.” See YouTube Help: Use Automatic Captioning, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6373554?hl=en [https://perma.cc/ST4J-NKZ7].
230. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 121–121A (2012 & Supp. 2019) (the Chafee Amendment to the Copyright Act, providing for the remediation of texts for people with print disabilities, amended to be consistent with the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled).
231. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 102 (2d Cir. 2014) (recognizing copying made in service of the Americans with Disabilities Act as a fair use).
232. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING: SEVENTH TRIENNIAL PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE EXEMPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION 95–101 (2018), https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2018/2018_Section_1201_Acting_Registers_Recommendation.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EAV-Q6C4].
233. See generally REID, supra note 195 (describing the post-HathiTrust viability of thirdparty captioning efforts in the United States).
234. These questions of quality circle back to the threshold questions of whether platforms can be treated as “places” under Title III of the ADA and whether the DOJ’s regulatory authority and the administration of ADA judgments and settlements by federal judges is sufficiently nuanced and granular to carefully consider issues around quality. See supra Part II.
While it is unclear how advances in automatic content accessibility technology ultimately will evolve to address this problem, it is worth considering economic interventions to incentivize the development of tools and services that will enable making large quantities of content accessible. One example is found in Title IV of the ADA, whose provisions are codified in the telecommunications section of the U.S. Code.235 Title IV subsidizes third parties who provide relay services, which generally involve situating a human or automated communications assistant in the middle of a phone call to interpret between a nondisabled phone caller and another caller using sign language via video, provide captions, type out text communications, or one of several other variants.236 Most importantly, the costs of providing the services are recovered from users of telephone services via their phone carriers and administered by the FCC.237
The important insight from Title IV is that it facilitates the accessibility of an application—voice communication—by subsidizing the creation of accessible content (signed, captioned, and other adapted versions of one caller’s voice) that neither the content creator (the nondisabled caller) nor the application provider (the phone company) could ostensibly afford. It does so by requiring application providers to bake into the price of their service the cost of making it accessible, thereby spreading the cost among all users of an application. It also vests the FCC with the authority to structure the administration of the program to incentivize innovation that improves quality and drives costs down.238 ** 235. 47 U.S.C. § 225(a)(3), (b)(1)–(2) (2012). *See generally KAREN PELTZ STRAUSS, A NEW CIVIL RIGHT: TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUALITY FOR DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING AMERICANS 90–144 (2006) (detailing the early history of the relay system).
236. See Relay Services, FCC (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/general/relay-services [https://perma.cc/4ZMT-TDMF].
237. See 47 U.S.C. § 225(d)(3)(B).
238. Id. § 225(d); cf. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128 YALE L.J. 544 (2019) (discussing various innovation policy tools).
It is not clear whether such a model, or similar models such as the direct government funding of captioning239 or remediation of inaccessible books,240 would be workable for today’s dominant Internet platforms, many of which provide services at no direct cost to users and instead derive revenue through the provision of advertisements targeted using the data of their users.241 But these sorts of economic tweaks are one area of promise for unraveling the Gordian knot of allocating responsibility between the application and content layers of today’s platformdominated Internet ecosystem.
D. ISPs: Internet Access and Accessibility at the Physical and Network Layers
Disentangling the application and content layers of the Internet makes clear the need to consider the role of entities at all the layers of the Internet. And a user cannot access any application or content without connecting to the Internet via an Internet service provider (ISP).242 ISPs intermediate access to all Internet-enabled applications through their control over the implementation of protocols at the network layer and their provision at the physical layer of the wired and wireless infrastructure that facilitates the literal connection of users to the Internet.
This Section explores the accessibility dimensions of ISPs’ gatekeeping role over access to the Internet. Recalling the admittedly imperfect metaphor of the Internet as the “information superhighway,”243 it is worth briefly conceptualizing the physical and network layers as the roads and sidewalks of cyberspace—the connective tissue between places of public accommodation. In the real world, this issue is often the province of federal, state, and local governments that are governed not by Title III, but by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1976, which requires federal programs to be accessible,244 by Title II of the ADA, which requires the same for state and local government programs and services,245and by other federal laws.246 But the provision of Internet access service is largely the province of private companies that, except in scenarios involving state or municipally provided broadband, are not subject to Title II. Instead, the accessibility dimensions of ISPs are generally governed by telecommunications law.247
239. In an amicus brief I coauthored with Brian Wolfman on behalf of numerous disability organizations in the HathiTrust case, we catalogued the history of government efforts to fund the universal accessibility of content. Brief for American Association of People with Disabilities et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Author’s Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-4547), 2013 WL 2702551, at 7–16; see also STRAUSS, supra note 235, at 205–08 (describing in detail early efforts to fund captioning through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) (now the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)).
240. See That All May Read, LIBR. CONGRESS https://www.loc.gov/programs/national-library-service-for-the-blind-and-physically-handicapped/about-this-service/ [https://perma.cc/B2N4-TZPU].
241. Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 79 (2015).
242. Compare Areheart & Stein, supra note 8, at 452 n.20 (“[W]ithout [website accessibility], knowing about the Internet’s opportunities and signing up with an Internet service provider would be relatively meaningless.”), with Lipton, supra note 74, at 1343 (“No one can interact online without contracting with an ISP.”). See also Ekstrand, supra note 64, at 430 (acknowledging despite a focus on website accessibility that “the question of broadband access . . . is also important”).
243. Jonathan H. Blavin & I. Glenn Cohen, Gore, Gibson, and Goldsmith: The Evolution of Internet Metaphors in Law and Commentary, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 265, 269 (2002).
244. 29 U.S.C. § 701(c) (2012).
245. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (2012) (defining “public entit[ies]” in relevant part to include state and local governments and their subdivisions); id. § 12132 (prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities by “public entit[ies]”).
246. Robin Malloy has written extensively on the intersection of disability law and accessibility considerations with land use and zoning law. See MALLOY, supra note 122;Robin Paul Malloy, A Primer on Disability for Land Use and Zoning Law, 4 J.L. PROP. & SOC’Y 1 (2018); see also Schindler, supra note 15.
247. Paul Ohm and I have described the increasing convergence of disparate regulatory regimes as software proliferates throughout various sectors of society. Ohm & Reid, supra note 188; cf. Jacqueline Lipton, A Framework for Information Law and Policy, 82 OR. L. REV. 695, 778 (2003) (“[I]t may be that legal and policy matters that have more to do with regulating communications networks than regulating information per se properly belong to other fields of law.”) (emphasis in original).
Past is prologue in Internet policy, and telecommunications law’s treatment of the accessibility of networks long predates the Internet. Of course, many telecommunications networks—including radio, broadcast television, and cable and satellite television—have served as single-“application” mechanisms, in Internet-law terms, for the one-way distribution of content to people. And as the previous Section explained, the accessibility of those networks has primarily been facilitated by FCC regulations focused on remediating content—generally through the provision of captioning to make audiovisual and audio programming accessible to people who are deaf or hard of hearing and the provision of audio description to make video programming accessible to people who are blind or visually impaired—and requiring video playback devices to render accessibility features.248
But even within these integrated-networks-as-video-applications, issues of network protocol have played an important role in facilitating accessibility for people with disabilities. For example, television networks have long opposed the inclusion of open captions—captions “burned in” and enabled for all viewers, which cannot be turned off—on the grounds that hearing viewers would find them distracting.249 As a result, accessibility advocates and technologists facilitated the development of closed captions—which could be turned on or off by individual viewers—by developing standards for steganographically encoding captions into the invisible twenty-first scan line (“Line 21”) of broadcast signals, which is transmitted but not displayed on most TVs, thereby enabling the development of caption decoders to parse the invisible information and render it on-screen for viewers who are deaf or hard of hearing.250
Nowhere has the role of network protocol accessibility been more critically important than in the network that preceded and effectively enabled the development of the commercial Internet251—the telephone network. Of course, the telephone network, like one-way video distribution networks, was initially an integrated network designed to facilitate a single application—bidirectional voice communication.252
248. See supra Section III.C; STRAUSS, supra note 235, at 205–73 (describing the history of the development of the captioning system).
249. See STRAUSS, supra note 235, at 206.
250. See id. at 206–07.
251. See SHANE GREENSTEIN, HOW THE INTERNET BECAME COMMERCIAL: INNOVATION, PRIVATIZATION, AND THE BIRTH OF A NEW NETWORK (2015).
252. See generally Kevin Werbach, The Song Remains the Same: What Cyberlaw Might Teach the Next Internet Economy, 69 FLA. L. REV. 887 (2017).
The accessibility problems introduced by bidirectional voice communications are obvious in hindsight: an application that relies on both speech and hearing, without more, was certain to exclude people with speech and hearing disabilities. Karen Peltz Strauss has noted the cruel irony of the discriminatory nature of the telephone network, which grew out of the text-based telegraph system that Alexander Graham Bell had created specifically to help his deaf students, wife, and mother.253 It took deaf and hard of hearing advocates and technologists more than ninety years after Bell’s invention of the telephone network to begin the successful proliferation of the teletypewriter (TTY), which facilitates real-time, text-based communications by transmitting typed letters via audio tones over the phone line, that restored the access for deaf and hard of hearing people in the transition from the telegraph to the telephone.254
Though the full history of the accessibility of the telephone-network-as-voicecommunication-application is beyond the scope of this article,255 it is worth emphasizing that even the introduction of TTYs required overcoming discrimination against people with disabilities by AT&T, the proprietor of the phone network. Unlike the omissive failures described above,256 the discrimination against TTY users was overt—AT&T leveraged its dominant control over the phone system to deny its customers the ability to attach third-party devices, including TTYs, to the telephone network as illegal “foreign attachments.”257
A critical step in making the phone network accessible was the FCC’s Carterfone order, which concluded that excluding third-party devices from the network was a violation of the prohibition on “unreasonable discrimination” in the Communications Act of 1934.258 These important but underexplored antidiscrimination threads continued into the breakup of AT&T under antitrust law259 and were later addressed by Congress in the requirements of Section 255 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which requires telecommunications services and equipment to be made accessible to people with disabilities.260 And as voice telephony transitioned to the Internet, the FCC extended Section 255 to VoIP applications.261 Congress eventually gave the FCC extensive authority to regulate the accessibility of VoIP services under the advanced communications services provisions of the Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010 (CVAA),262 and the FCC has begun to facilitate the transition from TTY services to next-generation real-time text (RTT) services.263
253. STRAUSS, supra note 235, at 7.
254. See id. at 7–8.
255. Strauss has documented in significant detail the decades-long efforts to restore accessible communications to the telephone network. Id.
256. See supra Sections III.A–III.C.
257. See STRAUSS, supra note 235, at 9–10.
258. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 423 (1968); see also Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956); STRAUSS, supra note 235, at 9–10.
259. See STRAUSS, supra note 235, at 32–55 (discussing the history of accessibility issues during the AT&T breakup).
260. 47 U.S.C. § 255 (2012); see also STRAUSS, supra note 235, at 345–400 (discussing the enactment and implementation of Section 255).
261. IP-Enabled Servs., Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd. 11,275 (2007) (leveraging the FCC’s “ancillary jurisdiction” under Title I of the Communications Act).
262. Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-260, § 104, 124 Stat. 2751, 2755–61 (2010) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 617–618 (2012)).
263. See supra Section III.C & nn.208–212.
The broader lesson from the evolution of the accessibility provisions governing telephony is that telecommunications law has long played an important role in overcoming discrimination against people with disabilities, since even before the introduction of the ADA. That is, telecommunications law rightfully should be considered a first-order disability law alongside the ADA, and its anti-discrimination provisions should be embraced and engaged by disability advocates and scholars.
The important role of telecommunications law as disability law is more important as the prominence of the telephone network has given way to the Internet. This is no surprise, as the telephone network has transitioned from effectively serving only as a voice application to one of the key technological bases of the commercial Internet. The telephone network facilitated the rise of the commercial Internet by affording Internet access via dial-up Internet services, which featured modems that modulated digital IP-based communications into analog audio tones, transmitted them over the phone line, and reconverted them to digital signals for transmission over the Internet.264 It has continued to do so through the use of digital subscriber line (DSL) technology, which along with cable, satellite, cellular, and various other wired and wireless services, now connects hundreds of millions of Americans to the Internet.265
Early in the rise of the commercial Internet, Internet-law scholars recognized that discrimination was a critical threat to the future of the Internet. In 2003’s Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, Tim Wu called for “a direct scrutiny of broadband discrimination,” famously coining the term “net neutrality”—the notion, broadly speaking, that ISPs should not be able to leverage their positions as gatekeepers of “terminating access monopolies” against their users to discriminate against users’ access to the applications and content of their choice.266 Considerable scholarly, regulatory, and popular attention has been devoted to the Network Neutrality half of Wu’s title and its attendant implications for the economics and governance of—and innovation and free speech on—the Internet.267
264. See Amos Joel, Telecommunications and the IEEE Communications Society, IEEE COMMS. MAG., May 2002, at 6, 164, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=1006966 [https://perma.cc/KF3R-SUWB] (“Consumer access to data communication began in the early 1980s, before availability of the commercial Internet, with dial-up to various information services.”).
265. See CAMILLE RYAN & JAMIE M. LEWIS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015 (2017), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/acs/acs-37.pdf [https://perma.cc/FT6G-LPP9]; Giulia McHenry, Majority of Americans Use Multiple Internet-Connected Devices, Data Shows, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN.: NTIA BLOG (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2015/majority-americans-use-multiple-Internet-connected-devices-data-shows [https://perma.cc/Z3YQ-ZJQJ]; Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewInternet.org/fact-sheet/Internet-broadband/ [https://perma.cc/563XH2UZ].
266. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 142 (2003) (citing Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956)).
267. E.g., BJ Ard, Beyond Neutrality: How Zero Rating Can (Sometimes) Advance User Choice, Innovation, and Democratic Participation, 75 MD. L. REV. 984 (2016); Derek E. Bambauer, Against Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REV. 51, 79 (2015); Babette E.L. Boliek, FCC Regulation Versus Antitrust: How Net Neutrality Is Defining the Boundaries, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1627 (2011); Susan P. Crawford, Network Rules, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (2007); Daniel T. Deacon, Common Carrier Essentialism and the Emerging Common Law of Internet Regulation, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 133 (2015); Rob Frieden, Freedom to Discriminate: Assessing the Lawfulness and Utility of Biased Broadband Networks, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 655 (2018); Rob Frieden, What’s New in the Network Neutrality Debate, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 739 (2015); Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Neighbor Billing and Network Neutrality, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2006); Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Net Neutrality: Something Old; Something New, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 665 (2015); Lawrence Lessig, In Support of Network Neutrality, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 185 (2007); Daniel A. Lyons, Net Neutrality and Nondiscrimination Norms in Telecommunications, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 1029, 1029 (2012); Lauren Moxley, ERulemaking and Democracy, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 661, 672–90 (2016); Tejas N. Narechania, Agency Boundaries and Network Neutrality, 12 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 59 (2015); Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 19 (2009); Howard A. Shelanski, Competition Policy for Mobile Broadband Networks, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 97 (2004); Deborah T. Tate, Net Neutrality 10 Years Later: A Still Unconvinced Commissioner, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 509 (2014); Adam Thierer, Are “Dumb Pipe” Mandates Smart Public Policy? Vertical Integration, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 275 (2005); Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529 (2009); Christopher S. Yoo,* Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2005); Christopher S. Yoo, *Innovations in the Internet’s Architecture that Challenge the Status Quo, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79 (2010); Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 (2006); Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23 (2004); Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, a User’s Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 69 (2004); Vishal Misra, Net Neutrality Is All Good and Fine; the Real Problem Is Elsewhere, COLUMBIA.EDU (Nov. 2014), http://www.cs.columbia.edu/2014/net-neutrality/ [https://perma.cc/H7F8-HNE5].
However, some scholars have taken up the important but less explored focus of Wu’s work: Broadband Discrimination—that is, the potential for noneconomic discrimination by ISPs and the possibility of antidiscrimination remedies.268 Olivier Sylvain has conceptualized ISP discrimination along lines of race, ethnicity, and income in terms similar to those of disability scholars arguing for Internet accessibility, noting that the Internet “is the premier communications platform through which public life today is shaped” and that “[t]o be excluded from all of its affordances is either an act of defiance, ignorance, or the consequence of material misfortune and disadvantage.”269
268. E.g., Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 871 (2009) (arguing for a noneconomic conception of net neutrality); Jerry Kang, Race.net Neutrality, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2007) (highlighting the connection between racial discrimination and discrimination in the provision of Internet access); Lawrence Lessig, ReMarking the Progress in Frischmann, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1042 (2005) (“The aim of those pursuing network neutrality, however, is not some imagined neutrality, but rather the elimination of certain kinds of discrimination.”) (emphasis added); Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15 (2006) (unpacking the meaning of (anti-)discrimination on broadband networks); see also Adam Candeub, Networks, Neutrality & Discrimination, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 125 (2017) (comparing broadband discrimination to more traditional legal conceptions of discrimination such as bans on interracial and same-sex marriage); Rob Frieden, Internet Protocol Television and the Challenge of “Mission Critical” Bits, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 50–53 (2015) (discussing the contours of discrimination for the purpose of quality of service); Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a Nondiscrimination Rule Should Look Like, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16 (2015) (distinguishing between proponents of net neutrality as an antitrust concept and proponents of a broader conception that includes a “wider range of economic and noneconomic harms”) (internal citations omitted)).
269. Olivier Sylvain, Network Equality, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 443, 447 (2016).
The potential for discrimination problems involving people with disabilities at the network and physical layers has come to bear in the context of debates over network neutrality. People with disabilities were unexpectedly thrust into the FCC’s approach to network neutrality in 2014 when Mother Jones reported that Verizon lobbyists were urging members of Congress to spike then-pending FCC net neutrality rules on the grounds that they would hurt people with disabilities.270 The vague argument insinuated that it was necessary to single out the Internet traffic of people with disabilities, creating special “fast lanes” for accessible communications, to ensure their ability to use the Internet on equal terms.271 In effect, Verizon had argued for addressing one type of discrimination—the alleged performance shortcomings of a neutral Internet for accessible applications—with another, isolating applications used by people with disabilities for special treatment.
Verizon made the claims, however, without first consulting consumer organizations representing people with disabilities; the National Association of the Deaf (NAD), the National Federation of the Blind (NFB), and the American Association of People with Disabilities (AAPD) emphasized, on the record, that they had not been consulted.272 A coalition of disability organizations and researchers— which, in the interest of full disclosure, I represented at the FCC—quickly scrambled to investigate Verizon’s claims.
270. Erika Eichelberger, Verizon Says It Wants to Kill Net Neutrality to Help Blind, Deaf, and Disabled People, MOTHER JONES (June 13, 2014), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/06/verizon-comcast-net-neutrality-blind-deaf-disabled/ [https://perma.cc/45ZF-G8X2].
271. See Klint Finley, FCC Plans to Gut Net Neutrality, Allow Internet ‘Fast Lanes’, WIRED (Nov. 21, 2017, 3:36 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/fcc-prepares-to-unveil-plan-to-gut-net-neutrality/ [https://perma.cc/X63A-87TA].
272. See Eirchelberger, supra note 270.
The results of the coalition’s investigations, reported in filings to the FCC, revealed that the need for disability-specific treatment of applications was, at a minimum, considerably overstated, a conclusion noted in a widely shared article entitled Deaf Advocacy Groups to Verizon: Don’t Kill Net Neutrality on Our Behalf. 273 The coalition argued that making Internet-based applications accessible “is possible on an open network and without the need for broadband providers to specifically identify traffic from accessibility applications and separate it out for special treatment.”274 The coalition noted that accessibility concerns could be addressed, along with similar concerns that would apply to broad classes of applications through the FCC’s allowance of non-discriminatory “reasonable network management” practices, and urged the Commission to reject using disability as a basis for allowing ISPs to discriminate among applications.275
The coalition argued not only that disability-specific fast lanes are unnecessary to achieve Internet accessibility, but also that affording ISPs the ability to discriminate could result in placing applications that people with disabilities relied upon in a slow lane—or blocking them altogether.276 The coalition described how ISPs had blocked the use of video conferencing services, including Apple FaceTime and Google Hangouts, which are frequently relied upon by American Sign Language users to communicate with each other.277 The coalition noted that ISP blocking and prioritization that hindered video communication by signers often occurred in places of employment and places of public accommodation, such as coffee shops and airports, arguably in violation of the ADA.278 The coalition also noted the importance of nondiscrimination in the administration of Internet access plans, explaining that the data caps imposed on many plans, while sufficient for many users, hindered the ability for deaf and hard of hearing users to engage in basic communications over video while forcing them to pay extra for voice services that they could not use.279
273. Jon Brodkin, Deaf Advocacy Groups to Verizon: Don’t Kill Net Neutrality on Our Behalf, ARS TECHNICA (July 22, 2014, 1:06 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/07/deaf-advocacy-groups-to-verizon-dont-kill-net-neutrality-on-our-behalf/[https://perma.cc/DZ7G-2FHY].
274. Comments of Telecommunications for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, Inc., National Association of the Deaf, Hearing Loss Association of America, Deaf and Hard of Hearing Consumer Advocacy Network, Rehabilitation Engineering Research Center on Telecommunications Access & Clayton H. Lewis, GN Docket No. 14-28, 7 (2014), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7521707584.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5A4-AMKZ]; see also Ex Parte of TDI, et al., Re: Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 14-28, 1–2 (2014), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60000986040.pdf [https://perma.cc/HB42-P6YY]; American Association of People with Disabilities & National Council on Independent Living, In the Matter of Proposed Rulemaking to Protect Open Internet (2014), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7521701850.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5CH-E5QR].
275. See Comments of TDI et al., supra note 274, at 5 n.13.
276. See id. at 4–7.
277. Id.
278. See id. at 13–15.
279. See id. at 15–16.
In the landmark 2015 Open Internet Order, the FCC ignored Verizon’s arguments and adopted bans on application-based blocking, throttling, and other rules,280 as well as specific transparency requirements aimed at ensuring that people with disabilities could evaluate the suitability of broadband plans for use with accessible applications.281 However, the rules were reopened following the election of Donald Trump and his appointment of Ajit Pai as the Chairman of the FCC. Chairman Pai, who dissented from the 2015 Order,282 immediately opened a rulemaking aimed at abolishing the rules.283
Net neutrality opponents again raised the specter of disability-specific prioritization as a justification for abolishing the rules,284 but cited as evidence only a decade-old (and failed) experiment by the Welsh government to provide video calling to citizens with disabilities over prioritized connections.285 The coalition of disability advocates and researchers urged the FCC to maintain the antidiscrimination rules, noting that there was no serious evidence of a need for disability-specific prioritization286 and that the rules had effectively curtailed the discriminatory blocking of applications, yielding a slew of new high-bandwidth video conferencing and personal navigation applications287 needed by people with disabilities.288 The coalition again raised alarm bells over the increasing use of data caps by ISPs, which hindered the increasing usage of high-bandwidth applications by people with disabilities289 and emphasized the danger of ISPs building their own proprietary video conferencing and navigation systems, tying people with disabilities who relied on those applications to specific network providers and increasing the incentives for discrimination against competing applications.290 The FCC ignored these concerns, rescinding the blocking and throttling rules later in the* 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order*.291
280. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5603 (Mar. 12, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 Open Internet Order].
281. Id. at 5672 (“[T]he need for enhanced transparency is bolstered by the needs of certain user groups who rely on broadband as their primary avenue for communications, such as people with disabilities.”) (citing Comments of Telecommunications for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, Inc. et al., GN Docket No. 14-28, 2–4 (2017)).
282. Id. at 5921 (dissenting statement of Commissioner Ajit Pai).
283. Restoring Internet Freedom, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 32 FCC Rcd. 4434 (2017).
284. See Comments of Comcast, WC Docket No. 17-108, 56 (2017), https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filing/107171777114654 [https://perma.cc/ZRV3-H2KM] (citing Brent Skorup, The FCC’s Misguided Paid Priority Ban, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (April 13, 2017), https://techliberation.com/2017/04/13/the-fccs-misguided-paid-priority-ban/ [https://perma.cc/UGP8-H6B2]); see also Martin Geddes, Why You Should Demand #NetMorality Instead of #NetNeutrality, GEDDES (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.martingeddes.com/why-youshould-demand-netmorality-instead-of-net-neutrality/ [https://perma.cc/XC9M-9GSS] (suggesting that net neutrality is a barrier to “a world where the deaf can access cheap and reliable video sign language, without any legal barriers to its delivery”).
285. See Reply Comments of Telecommunications for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, Inc., National Association of the Deaf, GN Docket No. 14-28, 2–3 (Aug. 30, 2017), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1083154418869/2017.08.30%20Consumer%20Groups%20%2B%20Researchers%20Open%20Internet%20Reply%20Comments%20Final.pdf[https://perma.cc/KQN5-6HZ5] (internal citations omitted).
286. Id. at 2–4.
287. These navigation applications allow people who are blind or visually impaired to transmit the world around them via a wearable video camera back to a service that provides real-time audio description of what is in front of them. Id. at 3–4.
288. Id. at 4–7.
289. Id.
290. See id. at 12–14.
291. Restoring Internet Freedom, Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and Order, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (Jan. 4, 2018) [hereinafter 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order]. In 2019, the DC Circuit largely upheld the Restoring Internet Freedom Order but remanded to the FCC for further proceedings on several discrete issues where it concluded that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Federal Communicaions Commission, Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, No. 18-1051 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/Internet/opinions.nsf/FA43C305E2B9A35485258486004F6D0F/$file/18- 1051-1808766.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQ24-HSFZ].
A full exploration of the implications of network deployment and operation policy at the physical and network layers for accessibility is beyond the scope of this article, and this article leaves unexplored, for example, important issues of broadband deployment to people with disabilities292 and the impact of wireless spectrum policy on hearing aids.293 But the net neutrality saga serves to underscore that Internet accessibility will require addressing issues of discrimination at the network and physical layers. Telecommunications law will continue to be an important complement to the ADA in the tangle of disability laws that must ultimately be applied to achieve Internet accessibility
E. Accessible Devices and the Internet of Things
Finally, making the constituent layers of the Internet accessible will not suffice to make the whole Internet accessible if the devices that people with disabilities use to connect to the Internet and interact with Internet-enabled applications are not themselves accessible. As James Grimmelmann and Paul Ohm have explained, the value of applying non-discrimination principles to the Internet itself can be significantly constrained by the failure to apply those same principles to the devices that connect to the Internet.294
292. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 280, at 5826–27 (“Adoption of Internet access services by persons with disabilities can enable these individuals to achieve greater productivity, independence, and integration into society in a variety of ways.”); FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 23 (2010), https://transition.fcc.gov/national-broadband-plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/88U4-Q5G6] (noting lower rates of broadband adoption “[a]mong people with disabilities, who face distinctive barriers to using broadband”); Elizabeth E. Lyle, A Giant Leap & A Big Deal: Delivering on the Promise of Equal Access to Broadband for People with Disabilities 15–18 (FCC Omnibus Broadband Initiative, Working Paper No. 2, 2010) (articulating a strategy for increasing broadband adoption among people with disabilities).
293. E.g., Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Governing Hearing Aid-Compatible Mobile Handsets, 32 FCC Rcd. 9063, para. 42 (Oct. 26, 2017) (discussing standards for radiofrequency interference in the context of the FCC’s hearing-aid compatibility (HAC) rules). See generally STRAUSS, supra note 235, at 293–320 (describing the history of the HAC rules).
294. See Grimmelmann & Ohm, supra note, 107 at 926 (noting in the context of generativity and net neutrality that “[a] neutral network that connects only appliances isn’t generative; an occasionally discriminatory network that connects PCs can be”).
The desire for accessible devices dates back to at least the early nineteenth century, when Pellegrino Turri invented a typing machine and carbon paper for Countess Carolina Fantoni da Fivizzano—his friend who was blind.295 Thomas Edison likewise invented the phonograph for the express purpose of making books accessible in aural form to blind people.296 But in the Internet age, the accessibility of personal devices is becoming increasingly important as the devices constituting the so-called “Internet of Things” (IoT)—i.e., devices that connect to the Internet— proliferate at an increasing scale. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has noted predictions that the number of Internet-connected devices in the United States will increase from 2.3 billion to 4.1 billion between 2015 and 2020, “portend[ing] significant and in some cases revolutionary changes[] [and] offer[ing] the potential for industry, government, and individuals to reap benefits interms of increased efficiency, safety, and convenience that were previously impossible.”297
Though IoT devices have been described in terms of numerous and varying characteristics,298 the most salient category for the purpose of this article is the devices that people use to interact with applications on the Internet, which range from desktop and laptop computers to phones and tablets to digital televisions to devices in clothing, cars, airplanes, and household appliances.299 IoT devices enable a variety of input and output modalities, including speech and pressure-sensitive touchscreens and screen less devices that communicate with aural and/or tactile feedback.
These input and output modalities create significant potential for accessibility problems. For example, virtual assistant applications, including Amazon’s Echo, Google’s Assistant, and Apple’s Siri, are embedded into so-called “smart speaker” devices that listen for verbal instructions and questions and respond with aural feedback.300 While these devices can be a significant boon for people who are blind or visually impaired,301 they can remain effectively inaccessible to people with hearing or speech disabilities who are unable to use the devices’ input and output modalities.302
295. See LAZAR ET AL., supra note 6, at 23.
296. See generally id. at 23–25.
297. THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE & DIGITAL ECONOMY LEADERSHIP TEAM, FOSTERING THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS 3–4 (2017) [hereinafter* IoT Green Paper] (citing *VNI Complete Forecast Highlights Tool, CISCO (2016), http://www.cisco.com/c/m/en_us/solutions/service-provider/vni-forecast-highlights.html [https://perma.cc/M2RL-LKU7] (“Global” and “United States” selected)).
298. E.g., Ohm & Reid, supra note 188, at 1676–77 (describing the proliferation of microprocessors in IoT devices). The NTIA noted in the IoT Green Paper that “[t]here was no consensus among commenters on a formal definition of IoT, or even on whether a common definition would be useful.” See FOSTERING THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS, supra note 298, at 5.
299. See Mobile Accessibility at W3C, W3C, https://www.w3.org/WAI/standards-guidelines/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/T4F8-QRJ5] (cited with approval in Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 381, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)). Accessibility dimensions of smart cities, smart homes, and autonomous vehicles may also prove important.
300. See Micah Singleton, Nearly a Quarter of US Households Own a Smart Speaker, According to Nielsen, THE VERGE (Sept. 30, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/circuitbreaker/2018/9/30/17914022/smart-speaker-40-percent-us-households-nielsenamazon-echo-google-home-apple-homepod [https://perma.cc/9QDP-6JWU].
301. See Jacob Kleinman, Smart Speakers Are a Great Tool for the Visually Impaired, LIFEHACKER (Apr. 16, 2018, 1:45 PM), https://lifehacker.com/smart-speakers-are-a-great-tool-for-the-visually-impair-1825294036 [https://perma.cc/ALG8-ECKD].
302. Of course, some later iterations of these systems have adapted to include screens, touch input, and other modalities that may make them accessible, though this raises questions about the level of abstraction at which an ecosystem of related devices can be described as accessible—must every device in the system be accessible, or most, or many, or even one? See Ry Crist, Amazon’s Echo Show Makes Alexa More Accessible to the Deaf and SpeechImpaired, CNET (July 23, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-tap-to-alexa-accessibility-feature/ [https://perma.cc/WKM4-4868] (describing efforts to make smart speakers more accessible).
Internet-law scholars have raised significant concerns about the potential for discrimination in IoT devices.303 But few scholars have addressed the potential for IoT devices to yield discrimination against people with disabilities,304 largely focusing instead on discrimination rooted in the widespread collection of personal data by IoT devices and the attendant privacy, security, and economic harms resulting from the use of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other technologies to exploit the data.305 That is, scholars have largely focused on the extent to which IoT devices can indirectly result in discrimination, rather than the extent to which IoT devices can be inherently discriminatory by way of inaccessibility.306
303.* E.g., Peppet, *supra note 119.
304. Cf. Mary Madden, Michele Gilman, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, Privacy, Poverty, and Big Data: A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53, 93 & n.203 (2017) (raising the role of social network data in associational discrimination against people with disabilities in employment contexts).
305. See, e.g., Julie Brill, The Internet of Things: Building Trust and Maximizing Benefits Through Consumer Control, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 205 (2014); Stacy-Ann Elvy,* Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59B.C. L. REV. 423(2018); Margot E. Kaminski, Matthew Rueben, William D. Smart & Cindy M. Grimm, *Averting Robot Eyes, 76 MD. L. REV. 983 (2017); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805 (2016); Steven I. Friedland, Of Clouds and Clocks: Police Location Tracking in the Digital Age, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 165 (2015); Meg Leta Jones, Privacy Without Screens & the Internet of Other People’s Things, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 639 (2015); Madden, supra note 305; Margot E. Kaminski, Robots in the Home: What Will We Have Agreed To?, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 661 (2015); Irina D. Manta & David S. Olson, Hello Barbie: First They Will Monitor You, Then They Will Discriminate Against You. Perfectly., 67 ALA. L. REV. 135 (2015); Christina Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes on the Internet of Things, 50 GA. L. REV. 1121 (2016); Scott J. Shackelford, Anjanette Raymond, Danuvasin Charoen, Rakshana Balakrishnan, Prakhar Dixit, Julianna Gjonaj & Rachith Kavi, When Toasters Attack: A Polycentric Approach to Enhancing the “Security of Things”, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 415 (2017). Security concerns can intersect with accessibility when users with disabilities choose not to install security patches in operating system updates out of concern that doing so will break accessibility features. See, e.g., The Accessibility Bugs Introduced and Resolved in iOS 12 for Blind and Low Vision Users, APPLEVIS (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.applevis.com/blog/apple-ios-news/accessibility-bugs-introduced-and-resolved-ios-12-blind-and-low-vision-users [https://perma.cc/WL6Y-7N7A]. Likewise, security bugs can disable functionality relied upon by people with disabilities. E.g., Nicole Perlroth, Apple Was Slow to Act on FaceTime Bug That Allows Spying on iPhones, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/technology/facetime-glitch-apple.html [https://perma.cc/Y356-XMEH] (describing Apple’s temporary shutdown of the FaceTime video-conferencing application, often relied upon by sign language users).
306. However, design scholars have analyzed some of the technical and social dimensions of IoT accessibility in the context of the Universal Design literature. See, e.g., Vladimir Tomberg, Trenton Schulz, and Sebastian Kelle, Applying Universal Design Principles to Themes for Wearables, in UNIVERSAL ACCESS IN HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERATION 550, 554–55 (2015).
Moreover, the accessibility of these personal devices has not been significantly addressed under Title III. Title III has been applied where devices bear a significant connection to a physical place of public accommodation, such as the accessibility of an ATM at a bank or other business, a computer at an Internet café, a registration kiosk at a hotel, or a point-of-sale device at a retail store.307 Most recently, these types of cases have been brought against or contemplated in the context of so-called“sharing economy” companies such as Uber,308 Bird, and Lime309 that fail to make transportation services like cars and scooters accessible to people with disabilities.310 Title III can also apply where a device is itself contemplated as an means of accessibility for an inaccessible place of public accommodation—in Title III’s terminology, an “auxiliary aid”—such as an assistive listening device, a closed caption decoder, a telephone handset amplifier, or a screen reader or magnification software used to make the services of a place of public accommodation accessible.311
307. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,236, 56,315 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35); see also Areheart & Stein, supra note 8, at 451 (“The ADA has played a central role in compelling the accessibility of a host of software applications, cell phones, ATMs, and e-book reading devices.”).
308. E.g., Crawford v. Uber, No. 17-CV-02664-RS, 2018 WL 1116725, at 1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2018) (allowing Title III claims to proceed against Uber’s Internet-enabled ridesharing service for failure to provide vehicles accessible to wheelchair users).
309. E.g., Montoya et al. v. Bird Rides Inc. et al., DISABILITY RIGHTS CAL. (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.disabilityrightsca.org/cases/montoya-et-al-v-bird-rides-inc-et-al [https://perma.cc/Z8CV-SW9R] (alleging a violation of Title III stemming from the abandonment of electric scooters in public places that impedes the ability of people in wheelchairs to navigate sidewalks and other thoroughfares). See generally Cyrus Farivar, Bird, Lime Sued By Disability Rights Activists Who Claim Obstructed Sidewalks, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 22, 2019, 7:36 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/01/e-scooter-startups-city-of-san-diego-sued-by-local-disabled-plaintiffs/ [https://perma.cc/RCH2-PVP4].
310. Similar concerns have arisen in the context of room-sharing services such as Airbnb. Niraj Chokshi and Katie Benner, Airbnb Hosts More Likely to Reject the Disabled, a Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/02/technology/airbnb-disability-study.html [https://perma.cc/U86S-MHQC].
311. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b) (2018); see also Ekstrand, supra note 64, at 430 (“While the question of . . . assistive devices is also important . . . .”) (emphasis added).
But Title III has not been significantly or directly applied to the accessibility of personal devices purchased by consumers. Indeed, the Department of Justice has declared that “the ADA does not apply directly to the manufacture of products,” and that it “lacks the authority to issue design requirements for equipment designed exclusively for use in private homes.”312 And what, precisely, might be required to make devices accessible raises significant technical questions about the nature of accessible product design.
Non-ADA legal regimes have, to some degree, compensated for Title III’s perceived inability to require device accessibility. Legal mandates for the accessibility of devices and software used for person-to-person communications date back to the pre-Internet Telecommunications for the Disabled Act of 1982, which mandated rudimentary accessibility for the telephone system, including compatibility between phones and hearing aids.313 In the Internet era, Section 255 of the Communications Act314 and the corresponding guidelines developed by the U.S.Access Board315 and the FCC316 directly mandated the accessibility of equipment used for telecommunications services, such as telephones, routers, switches, set-top boxes, and home networking equipment used to connect telephone and VoIP services.317 Likewise, Sections 102 and 104 of the CVAA318 and the corresponding regulations developed by the FCC extended Section 255 to new advanced communications services equipment used to facilitate electronic messaging, VoIP, and video conferencing services,319 as well as to web browsers built into mobile phones.320
Likewise, non-ADA regimes have augmented Title III by requiring the accessibility of devices used to view video programming. These mandates date back to the Television Decoder Circuitry Act of 1990 (TDCA), which required televisions thirteen inches or larger to include closed-captioning decoders.321 The TDCA’s provisions, updated by Sections 203 and 204 of the CVAA322 and elaborated upon in the FCC’s corresponding rules,323 now require video playback devices of all sorts, including Internet-enabled video devices, to enable closed captions and video descriptions and to have accessible user interfaces.324
312. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,315.
313. To Amend the Communications Act of 1934 to Provide Reasonable Access to Telephone Service for Persons with Impaired Hearing and to Enable Telephone Companies to Accommodate Persons with Other Physical Disabilities., Pub. L. No. 97–410, 96 Stat. 2043 (1983); see also STRAUSS, supra note 235, at 34–35.
314. 47 U.S.C. § 255(b) (2012); see also STRAUSS, supra note 235, at 345–84.
315. The Access Board is an independent agency of the U.S. government created in 1973 to help oversee the development of standards for the Architectural Barriers Act, a predecessor to the ADA that required making federal government facilities accessible. See generally History of the Access Board, U.S. ACCESS BOARD, https://www.access-board.gov/the-board/board-history [https://perma.cc/NFX5-YPW5].
316. 36 C.F.R. §§ 1194.2 & App’x B.
317. Id. §§ 1194.2 & App’x B (C103.4) (defining “customer premises equipment”).
318. Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010, P.L. 111-260, § 104, 124 Stat. 2751 (2010).
319. See supra Section III.C & nn.206–10 (detailing the ACS rules).
320. 47 U.S.C. § 619(a) (2012); 47 C.F.R. § 14.60(b) (2018) (extending the ACS equipment accessibility rules and certain compatibility rules to web browsers on mobile phones). See generally Implementation of Section 718 of the Communications Act of 1934, Report and Order, 28 FCC Rcd. 5957 (2013) (implementing the web browser regulations).
321. To Require New Televisions to Have Built in Decoder Circuitry., Pub. L. No. 101–431, 104 Stat. 960 (1990); see also STRAUSS, supra note 235, at 226–45 (describing the history of the TDCA’s development).
322. §§ 203–04, 124 Stat. at 2772–74.
323. See supra note 205.
324. §§ 203–04, 124 Stat. at 2772–74; 47 C.F.R. pt. 79, subpt. B.
But the Section 255 guidelines, ACS rules, and video programming rules are not universally applicable and cover only limited classes of networking equipment, communications devices and software, certain web browsers, and video playback hardware and software, and do not fully cover a significant proportion of IoT devices with functionality that goes beyond these contours.325 While the FCC contemplated extending its Section 255 and ACS rules further in its 2015 Open Internet Order by applying Section 255 to ostensibly all equipment connected to the Internet,326 the 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order rescinded this broad application of Section 255.327 The FCC has also routinely granted exemptions to its ACS and user interface rules for advanced communications services embedded in television sets and video players,328 video game systems,329 e-book readers,330 and cars.331
325.* Implementation of Sections 716 and 717 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Enacted by the Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 26 FCC Rcd. 14,557 (2011) (ACS Report and Order); *see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 618–19 (2012); 47 CFR §§ 14.1–14.52 (2018).
326. See 2015 Open Internet Order, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5826-5831, ¶¶ 472–476.
327. 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order, 33 FCC Rcd. at 409, ¶ 164 & n.600.
328. Consumer Electronics Association and National Cable & Telecommunications Association Peititons for Class Waivers, Order, 27 FCC Rcd. 12,970, 12,975–76, 12,979–81 (2012) (granting waivers from the ACS rules for IP-based video players, televisions, and cable boxes that expired in 2015).
329. Entertainment Software Association Petition for Class Waiver, Order, 32 FCC Rcd. 10,448, 10,448–50 (2017) (granting a final one-year class waiver from the ACS rules for communication functionality in video game software, which the FCC had initially granted in 2012 for video game consoles, distributions, and software, and which was narrowed to video game software in 2015) (preceding history omitted).
330. Coalition of E-Reader Manufacturers’ Petition for Class Waiver, Order, 31 FCC Rcd. 858, 861–62 (2016) (extending indefinitely a waiver of the ACS rules for communication functionality in certain e-book readers, which the Commission initially granted in 2014) (preceding history omitted). E-reader manufacturers provided a report on progress in making e-readers accessible in 2019. See Coalition of E-Reader Manufacturers Report, In re Implementations of Sections 716 and 717 of the Communications Act of 1934, No. 10-213 (Mar. 5, 2019).
331. Accessibility of User Interfaces, and Video Programming Guides and Menus, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 33 FCC Rcd. 4450 (2018) (granting a waiver to Honda for user interfaces on entertainment systems in cars); Accessibility of User Interfaces, and Video Programming Guides and Menus, Order, 32 FCC Rcd. 7275 (2017) (same for Chrysler). The FCC is presently in the process of considering a waiver request for the communications system in General Motors’s autonomous vehicle ride-hailing service. FCC, Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau Invites Comment on a Petition Filed by General Motors Holding LLC for Partial Waiver of Real-Time Text Minimum Functionality Requirements, Public Notice (Jan. 25, 2018), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-18-1301A1.pdf[https://perma.cc/YP5N-YZQ7].
Somewhat more promising in their scope are the Access Board’s guidelines332 implementing Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act.333 The guidelines contain relatively comprehensive accessibility guidelines that cover all “[i]nformation and [c]ommunication[s] [t]echnology (ICT),” including devices, broadly defined—and even software, applications, websites, and content.334 However, Section 508’s coverage is severely limited to ICT procured by federal government agencies,335 meaning that it requires accessibility of devices only indirectly where vendors sell devices to the government.336
In short, there exists no legal regime that comprehensively mandates accessibility for IoT devices. While industry and disability organization representatives on the FCC’s Disability Advisory Committee (of which I am a member) acknowledged the serious shortcomings of accessibility on IoT devices and recommended that the FCC conduct a sweeping study on IoT accessibility,337 little action has been taken toward this end, and it remains to be seen what legal regimes will develop to address IoT accessibility—a critical component of a comprehensive approach to Internet accessibility.