Russian Disinformation Efforts

Russian Disinformation Efforts

Russian Disinformation Efforts

“We will never know whether the Russian intervention was determinative in such a close election. … What does matter is this: The Russians successfully meddled in our democracy and our intelligence agencies have concluded they will do so again.”¹⁵

Democratic Representative Adam Schiff

Origins of State-Backed Meddling

To better understand the events that have recently unfolded in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, I will begin by isolating the effects of disinformation as fueled only by the Kremlin. Reflecting on events prior to 2016, it is worth noting that Russia underwent its own 2012 Presidential election and for the first time the international community saw Vladimir Putin reportedly adopt an aggressive “trolling” campaign against his political opponents in the months leading up to the election.¹⁶ This was a never before seen offensive strategy aimed at utilizing “trolls,” or Kremlin-backed accounts, on various social media platforms to persuade voters through consistent exposure to state-funded smear campaigns that aimed to delegitimize Putin’s opponent, Gennady Zyuganov.¹⁷ It was through this successful experimentation that the Kremlin had realized that the previous strategy of attempting to influence political leaders within the United States through mass “phishing” attempts as reported in the years prior to the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election was far less effective than utilizing Kremlin-funded “bots” and “trolls” to

¹⁵ Reuters Staff, “Key Quotes from Congress’ Hearing on Russia and the U.S. Election,” Reuters, March 20, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-factbox/key-quotes-from-congress-hearing-on-russia-and-the-us-election-idUSKBN16R229.

¹⁶ Select Committee on Intelligence - United States Senate, “SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION,” United States Senate - Intelligence, vol. Volume 2: RUSSIA’S USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS (Washington D.C.: United States Senate, 2019), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf.

¹⁷ Ibid.

target and influence American voters.¹⁸ It was through Putin’s domestic efforts, that the Kremlin was able to adopt a more technically advanced playbook as it narrowed its focus on the upcoming U.S. election.

Russia and the 2016 Election

And as the 2016 U.S. presidential election took shape, we witnessed a growing domestic divide among American voters on certain key topics such as immigration policy, oppression against minorities, and second amendment rights. This divide was only fueled by a growing vocalization of extreme political views that countered the opposing party’s ideology. These polarized posts had higher user interaction rates since they were being circulated by users more often, thus making them appear in the social media algorithm as more popular because of users supporting or objecting to the extreme content within the post.¹⁹ We later learned that platforms such as Facebook then implemented the practice of data mining to analyze and build refined profiles of each user based on how they would interact with the content.²⁰ This allowed artificial intelligence to feed certain posts to the user based on their unique data metric profiles.²¹ It did not take long for private companies and international adversaries to exploit the opportunity to use the data profiles gathered on millions of Facebook users and start feeding information into these

¹⁸ Marie Baezner and Robin Patrice, “Hotspot Analysis: Cyber-Conflict between the United States of America and Russia (Volume 1),” Center for Security Studies (CSS) (Zürich: ETH Zürich, June 2017), https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2017-02.pdf.

¹⁹ Ivan Garibay et al., “Polarization in Social Media Assists Influencers to Become More Influential: Analysis and Two Inoculation Strategies,” Scientific Reports 9, no. 1 (December 9, 2019): 1–9, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-55178-8.

²⁰ Natasha Singer, “What You Don’t Know About How Facebook Uses Your Data,” The New York Times, April 11, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/technology/facebook-privacy-hearings.html.

²¹ Ibid.

polarized “echo chambers,” or like-minded communities that strategically filter opposing views through an algorithm.²²

As reported by the Senate Committee on Intelligence’s second report on Russian campaign interference in 2016, the digital advertising expenses for the 2016 election increased by 789 percent or $1.4 billion over what had been reported in the 2012 election.²³ With greater insight into the behavioral data on countless social media users, not only did political candidates identify an opportunity to advance their unique narratives with the hopes of being elected, but Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA) also tapped into this information to target voters in an attempt to discredit candidates at multiple levels on both sides if they opposed the Kremlin.²⁴

The Kremlin in doing this had identified a critical flaw that tech giants could not mitigate and it proved to be an unanticipated threat. As social media became further politicized and used by voters for accessing news leading up to the 2016 election, it has exposed a vulnerability that allowed the once free flow of information between Americans to become manipulated and diluted by those with ill intent in the broader international community.²⁵ This paved way for a newfound tactic within the art of psychological warfare. As Christopher Wylie, a former Cambridge Analytica employee explained, “If you’re trying to hack a person’s mind, you need to identify cognitive biases and then exploit them.”²⁶ The Kremlin would prove to do just that by introducing a new form of hybrid warfare.

²² Kartik Hosanagar, “Blame the Echo Chamber on Facebook. But Blame Yourself, Too,”* WIRED* (WIRED, November 25, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/facebook-echo-chamber/.

²³ Select Committee on Intelligence - United States Senate, “SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION,”* United States Senate - Intelligence,* vol. Volume 2: RUSSIA’S USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS (Washington D.C.: United States Senate, 2019), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Christopher Wylie, MINDF CK : Cambridge Analytica and the Plot to Break America. (S.L.: Random House, 2019).

The Design of Russian Disinformation Entities

To adopt and successfully implement this strategy of hybrid warfare, the Kremlin undertook a two-pronged approach to influence the 2016 election. It focused the first prong on the utilization of the Internet Research Agency (IRA), and the second prong relied on the aggressive execution by the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) cyber units. The IRA based out of St. Petersburg had developed a broad “information warfare” strategy as early as 2014, but this strategy had shifted to support President Trump in the months leading up to the election.²⁷ The GRU is the foreign military intelligence agency that reports directly to the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff.²⁸ Under the operations of the GRU in 2016 were Units 26165 and 74455, which were cyber operations units that directly targeted the computer networks of the presidential candidate, Hillary Clinton.²⁹ Through these coordinated efforts, the GRU had successfully accessed private information and leaked sensitive information that attacked the legitimacy of Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election.³⁰

Early Signs of a Growing Russian Threat

It is important to note that the offensive cyber operations of the GRU had coincided with various meetings between the Russian government and Trump Campaign officials.³¹ While there was no substantial evidence that could have established that the Trump Campaign conspired or

²⁷ Robert Mueller III, “Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election (Vol. 1),” U.S. Department of Justice Storage (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, March 2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf.

²⁸ Guy Faulconbridge, “What Is Russia’s GRU Military Intelligence Agency?,”* Reuters* (Reuters, October 5, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-russia-gru-factbox/what-is-russias-gru-military-intelligence-agency-idUSKCN1MF1VK.

²⁹ Robert Mueller III, “Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election (Vol. 1),” U.S. Department of Justice Storage (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, March 2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

coordinated with the Russian government in the state-sponsored actions aimed at disrupting the 2016 election, it is worth noting that the Kremlin had a clear bias in favor of Donald Trump which dated back to as early as 2015.³² This begs the question of whether the Kremlin had an authentic existing respect towards President Trump or if the Kremlin had early on identified an opportunity to utilize the controversial relationship with President Trump to further sow discord among the American people.

Before 2016, the United States had been aware of a growing cyber threat from opposing powers such as Russia. As noted within the Director of National Intelligence’s 2015 Worldwide Threat Assessment, the United States knew that Russia was gaining confidence in utilizing information warfare to combat the spread of democratic ideology and influence in the international community as top officials saw in Ukraine.³³ However, the United States did not adequately prepare for the sophisticated disinformation capabilities of the Russian state, which primarily targeted the American voters rather than the infrastructure of the polls or networks of politicians. Sources report that as early as 2014, the Obama administration had received preemptive warning about a growing threat posed by the growing offensive capabilities of the Kremlin, however, the State Department feared the potential retaliation that would follow from taking a more aggressive counter to the growing threats.³⁴ A former official of the Obama administration noted that there were several options under consideration to convey a strong message of condemnation to the Kremlin.³⁵ However, these options failed to be further pursued

³² Ibid.

³³ James R Clapper, “Statement for the Record Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community Senate Armed Services Committee,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence (Washington D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified_2015ATA_SFR-_SASC_FINAL.pdf.

³⁴ Ali Watkins, “Obama Team Was Warned in 2014 about Russian Interference,” POLITICO (POLITICO LLC, August 14, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/14/obama-russia-election-interference-241547.

³⁵ Ibid.

out of fear for the safety of diplomatic staff and defense attaches rather than the intelligence operatives who would be carrying out a majority of the proposed actions.³⁶

The Aftermath of 2016

While the extent to which the Kremlin meddled in the 2016 United States presidential election can not be decisively quantified, it can be confidently argued that there was significant meddling within the electoral process. For example, “In 2016, Russian agents posted just under 30,000 times on Facebook, yet the operation generated almost 13 million shares, 15 million likes, and 1.3 million comments, according to a research team at Oxford University.”³⁷ And they displayed disinformation material directly on the Facebook timelines of over one-third of the U.S. population or 126 million users, according to the testimony by Facebook’s general counsel.³⁸ Additionally, Twitter reported, “that in the 10 weeks before the election some 3,814 Internet Research Agency accounts interacted with 1.4 million people,” and an additional 50,528 automated bot accounts had tweeted regarding the election which could have reached an even broader audience.³⁹ It is important to keep in mind that the above statistics are limited to the reach of disinformation on Facebook and Twitter, and evidence suggests that the Kremlin launched similar campaigns across various other platforms such as Instagram and YouTube.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Philip Elliott, “The Mueller Report Doesn’t Call Into Question Trump’s 2016 Win,” Time (TIME USA, April 18, 2019), https://time.com/5573537/mueller-report-russia-election-interference/.

³⁸ Elizabeth Weise, “Russian Fake Accounts Showed Posts to 126 Million Facebook Users,” USA TODAY (USA TODAY, October 30, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/10/30/russian-fake-accounts-showed-posts-126-million-facebook-users/815342001/.

³⁹ Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti, “The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So Far (Published 2018),” The New York Times, September 20, 2018, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-interference-election-trump-clinton.html?mtrref= www.google.com.

However, the Kremlin’s support of international disinformation campaigns has not stopped at the 2016 presidential election. The Department of Justice continues to unravel various pieces of evidence that point towards a continuation of these campaigns, despite several notable indictments of Russian nationals and Russian entities.

In 2018, the Department of Justice indicted Elena Alekseevna Khusyaynova, a Russian national charged with aiding a possibly state-backed aggressive disinformation media campaign during the 2016 presidential elections and beyond. This became officially known as “Project Lakhta”.⁴⁰ It is important to note that Elena Khusyaynova had received funding from Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin, a close ally of Vladimir Putin, who funded the infamous Internet Research Agency (IRA).⁴¹ It is noted by Yevgeny Vyshenkov, an affiliate of Prigozhin that, “Yevgeny Prigozhin believes he is the Czar’s right hand.”42 Within the official complaint, the Department of Justice provides evidence for continued social media influence between December 2016 and May 2018.⁴³ The evidence shows several attempts by the conspirators to target radical groups through social media campaigns that manipulated the narratives of various societal topics within the United States.⁴⁴

In order to lend credibility to the conspirators who aimed to target American social media users, the conspirators behind Project Lakhta had covertly adopted falsified personas of

⁴⁰ United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States of America v. ELENA ALEKSEEVNA KHUSYAYN0VA (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia September 28, 2018).

⁴¹ Amanda Macias and Mike Calia, “Trump Administration Sanctions ‘Putin’s Chef,’ Other Russians over 2016 Election Hacking,” CNBC (CNBC LLC, March 15, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/15/treasury-sanctions-putins-chef-other-russians-over-cyber-related-threats.html.

⁴² Thomas Grove, “Kremlin Caterer Accused in U.S. Election Meddling Has History of Dishing Dark Arts,” Wall Street Journal, February 16, 2018, sec. US, https://www.wsj.com/articles/kremlin-caterer-accused-in-u-s-election-meddling-has-history-of-dishing-dark-arts-1518823765.

⁴³ United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States of America v. ELENA ALEKSEEVNA KHUSYAYN0VA (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia September 28, 2018).

⁴⁴ Ibid.

American activists.⁴⁵ It was through these accounts that conspirators had utilized advanced analytic products to target users with aggressive social media advertising campaigns.⁴⁶ The intricacy behind Project Lakhta went as far as to acquire U.S. based computer network space in order to utilize virtual private networks (VPN’s) that would allow for the specialists to access the U.S. network from anywhere in the world.⁴⁷ The funds required to launch such a large scale offensive campaign were managed by Elena Alekseevna Khusyaynova, who sat at the center of this particular Department of Justice led investigation and indictment.⁴⁸ The evidence suggests that Khusyaynova requested the necessary funds for Project Lakhta from Concord Management and Consulting, an organization owned by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin.⁴⁹ It was through these requests that Concord affiliates wired vague or misrepresented funds directly to Khusyaynova for Project Lakhta.⁵⁰

The U.S. Department of Justice had earlier indicted Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin on 16 February 2018 under the rule of a grand jury for his involvement with Project Lakhta and

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷ United States District Court for the District of Columbia, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC * A/K/A MEDIASINTEZ LLC A/K/A * GLAVSET LLC A/K/A MIXINFO * LLC A/K/A AZIMUT LLC A/K/A * NOVINFO LLC, * CONCORD MANAGEMENT AND * CONSULTING LLC, CONCORD CATERING, * YEVGENIY VIKTOROVICH * PRIGOZHIN, * MIKHAIL IVANOVICH BYSTROV, * MIKHAIL LEONIDOVICH BURCHIK * A/K/A MIKHAIL ABRAMOV, * ALEKSANDRA YURYEVNA * KRYLOVA, * ANNA VLADISLAVOVNA * BOGACHEV A, * SERGEY PAVLOVICH POLOZOV, * MARIA ANATOLYEVNA BOVDA * A/K/A MARIA ANATOLYEVNA * BELYAEVA, * ROBERT SERGEYEVICH BOVDA, * DZHEYKHUN NASIMI OGLY * ASLANOV A/K/A JAYHOON * ASLANOV A/K/A JAY ASLANOV, * VADIM VLADIMIROVICH * PODKOPAEV, * GLEB IGOREVICH VASILCHENKO, * IRINA VIKTOROVNA KAVERZINA, * and * VLADIMIR VENKOV. (United States District Court for the District of Columbia February 16, 2018).

⁴⁸ United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States of America v. ELENA ALEKSEEVNA KHUSYAYN0VA (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia September 28, 2018).

⁴⁹ Neil MacFarquhar, “Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by U.S., Is Known as ‘Putin’s Cook,’” The New York Times, February 16, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/world/europe/prigozhin-russia-indictment-mueller.html.

⁵⁰ United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, United States of America v. ELENA ALEKSEEVNA KHUSYAYN0VA (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia September 28, 2018).

Concord Management and Consulting.⁵¹ The evidence obtained by the Department of Justice shows that by 2016, Concord Management and Consulting was funding the operating expenses of Project Lakhta with a monthly budget of over 1,250,000 U.S. Dollars.⁵² These funds fueled the rapid circulation of disinformation across American social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, with ease. However, despite his indictment, Prigozhin remains an unmanaged threat and resides within the borders of Russia.

President Trump’s Response to Russia

As the U.S. Department of Justice continues to utilize evidence from the U.S. Intelligence Community that links offensive acts carried out on behalf of Russian agents, oligarchs, and officials, Vladimir Putin vehemently has condemned on multiple occasions the claim of Russian interference in the 2016 election. During an interview with Fox News anchor Chirs Wallace, Putin stated, “Do you really believe that someone acting from the Russian territory could have influenced the United States and influenced the choice of millions of Americans? This is utterly ridiculous.”⁵³ The consistent denial of involvement by Putin has only been supported by the remarks of President Trump, as seen during a moderated discussion in Helsinki, Finland when the President states, “My people came to me — Dan Coats came to me and some others — they

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² United States District Court for the District of Columbia, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY LLC * A/K/A MEDIASINTEZ LLC A/K/A * GLAVSET LLC A/K/A MIXINFO * LLC A/K/A AZIMUT LLC A/K/A * NOVINFO LLC, * CONCORD MANAGEMENT AND * CONSULTING LLC, * CONCORD CATERING, * YEVGENIY VIKTOROVICH * PRIGOZHIN, * MIKHAIL IVANOVICH BYSTROV, * MIKHAIL LEONIDOVICH BURCHIK * A/K/A MIKHAIL ABRAMOV, * ALEKSANDRA YURYEVNA * KRYLOVA, * ANNA VLADISLAVOVNA * BOGACHEV A, * SERGEY PAVLOVICH POLOZOV, * MARIA ANATOLYEVNA BOVDA * A/K/A MARIA ANATOLYEVNA * BELYAEVA, * ROBERT SERGEYEVICH BOVDA, * DZHEYKHUN NASIMI OGLY * ASLANOV A/K/A JAYHOON * ASLANOV A/K/A JAY ASLANOV, * VADIM VLADIMIROVICH * PODKOPAEV, * GLEB IGOREVICH VASILCHENKO, * IRINA VIKTOROVNA KAVERZINA, * and * VLADIMIR VENKOV. (United States District Court for the District of Columbia February 16, 2018).

⁵³Max Greenwood, “Putin Refuses to Look at Mueller Indictment during Fox News Interview,” TheHill.com (The Hill, July 16, 2018), https://thehill.com/policy/international/397318-putin-refuses-to-look-at-indictment-during-fox-news-interview.

said they think it’s Russia. I have President Putin; he just said it’s not Russia. I will say this: I don’t see any reason why it would be…”.⁵⁴ These remarks provide a harsh contrast to the consistent stance of the U.S. Intelligence Community and undoubtedly has led to the creation of tension between the President, his security advisers, and the American people

However, after an outcry by Democratic Party leaders for a lack of response by President Trump for Russian interference during the 2016 election, in March of 2018, the Treasury Department had placed sanctions on 24 Russian entities and individuals.⁵⁵ However, critics of the President remained upset by the failure to acknowledge Russian interference in 2016. Chuck Schumer, Senate minority leader, was quoted saying, “I say to President Trump, your silence speaks on this issue.”⁵⁶

Russian Efforts Ahead of the 2020 Election

Given the lack of direct repercussions imposed on Russia for its attempt to influence the 2016 election, many expected to see the Kremlin display a willingness to further push the limits of what the U.S. government will tolerate. Beginning in February of 2018, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson provided a warning on early-stage Russian interference within the upcoming midterm elections.⁵⁷ In July of 2018, Microsoft went public with evidence showing Russian hackers had

⁵⁴ President Trump Vladimir Putin, Remarks by President Trump and President Putin of the Russian Federation in Joint Press Conference, The White House, July 16, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-putin-russian-federation-jointpress-conference/.

⁵⁵ Elana Schor, Andrew Restuccia, and Cory Bennett, “US Imposes New Sanctions on Russian Entities over 2016 Election Meddling,” POLITICO (POLITICO, March 15, 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-russia-us-imposes-new-sanctions-on-over-2016-election-meddling/.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Doug Stanglin, “Russia Already Meddling in U.S. Midterm Elections, Tillerson Says,” USA TODAY (USA TODAY, February 7, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/02/07/tillerson-russians-already-meddling-u-s-midterm-elections/ 314560002/.

attempted to launch a phishing page that targeted three congressional candidates.⁵⁸ And in December of 2018, Dan Coats, the Director of National Intelligence, conducted an investigation that concluded that Russia, alongside China and Iran, had successfully conducted influence campaigns during the 2018 midterm elections.⁵⁹ The actions taken by the Kremlin during the midterm elections were similar tactics to those of the 2016 election in terms of the disinformation strategy implemented across social media platforms.

More recently, there has been evidence that suggests that the IRA, which is linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin, remains active ahead of the 2020 Presidential election. Upon receiving a tip from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Facebook and Twitter uncovered several fake accounts that were directing users to a news site by the name of Peace Data, which was fed by Russian disinformation efforts.⁶⁰ However, this time the Russians had contracted out unwitting freelance American writers to create the news articles which were being published.⁶¹ While this attempt was intercepted by the U.S. government early on, it shows that the Kremlin has adopted a new approach to disinformation and it is attempting to direct social media users to state-backed “fringe websites” rather than solely relying on traditional social media posts.⁶² This proves that the threat of disinformation is continuing to evolve and further suggests the need for enhanced preventive measures to combat any offensive actions taken by a foreign adversary, such as Russia, prior to the 2020 election.

⁵⁸ Thomas Brewster, “Microsoft: Russian Hackers Are Targeting The Midterms,” Forbes (Forbes, July 20, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2018/07/20/russian-hackers-target-three-mid-term-candidates-says-microsoft/.

⁵⁹ Julian E. Barnes, “Russians Tried, but Were Unable to Compromise Midterm Elections, U.S. Says (Published 2018),” The New York Times, December 21, 2018, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/21/us/politics/russia-midterm-election-influence-coates.html.

⁶⁰ Sheera Frenkel and Julian E. Barnes, “Russians Again Targeting Americans With Disinformation, Facebook and Twitter Say,” The New York Times, September 1, 2020, sec. Technology, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/01/technology/facebook-russia-disinformation-election.html.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

In months leading up to the 2020 election, however, a whistleblower complaint by Brian Murphy, the former head of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at DHS, disclosed on several occasions that there was attempted censorship of intelligence analysis relating to the Russian interference efforts.⁶³ Murphy outlines an instance in which David Glawe, the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Homeland Security, had testified in 2018 on the matter to the House Committee on Homeland Security, but was then summoned to the White House and threatened to be fired by Secretary Nielsen at the orders of President Trump.⁶⁴ However, Glawe had managed to restore relations and return to his role but conveyed to Murphy that he would no longer be assisting him in matters that regard to Russian interference assessments.⁶⁵

In May 2020, Chad Wolf, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, was notified by Robert O’Brien, White House National Security Advisor, to have Brian Murphy shift his efforts from reporting on Russian interference to interference by China and Iran.⁶⁶ However, after continuing to report on Russian disinformation, Murphy was told by Wolf in a closed-door meeting to hold back further reports as this topic “made the President look bad”.⁶⁷ Afterward, Murphy asserts that he was excluded from future briefings and a leaked analysis allegedly misreported intelligence and downplayed the current threat presented by Russia ahead of the election.⁶⁸

⁶³ House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “Whistleblower Reprisal Complaint: MURPHY, BRIAN PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS,” House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Washington D.C.: DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, September 8, 2020), https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/murphy_wb_dhs_oig_complaint9.8.20.pdf.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

###Conclusion As the United States 2020 presidential election is underway, the public is now aware of the existing disinformation and cyber threat capabilities of opposing superpowers such as Russia and China. However, many remain skeptical of our preparedness given the postponement of the Director of National Intelligence’s Worldwide Threat Assessment, which typically outlines high-level initiatives and assessments set forth by the U.S. Intelligence Community. To complicate any preexisting threat of foreign adversaries targeting the 2020 United States presidential election, we are now working to combat an unprecedented global pandemic stemming from the virus, COVID-19.

Since the conclusion of the 2016 presidential election, we have undoubtedly experienced the continuation of an advancing polarization between the two major political parties and their followers within the United States. And this growing divide has only been amplified by the rise of the ‘Information Age’ and the growing user interaction across all major social media platforms.⁶⁹ As we continue to see an upward trend in the percentage of Americans who turn to social media to formulate their views and voice their opinions, are we willingly serving as accomplices in our adversaries’ pursuit to delegitimize the western democratic system?

⁶⁹ “Definition of Information Age,” Merriam-webster.com (Merriam-Webster, 2019), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Information%20Age.