Chinese Disinformation Efforts

Chinese Disinformation Efforts

Chinese Disinformation Efforts

“They’re calculating. They’re persistent. They’re patient. And they’re not subject to the righteous constraints of an open, democratic society or the rule of law.”⁷⁰

Christopher Wray, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Origins of State-Backed Meddling

The increase in disinformation campaigns can not be solely attributed to the Russian government, as we have recently begun to see the Chinese government follow suit in particular since 2016. Reflecting on the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it is important to note that the Chinese government has been controlled by the Chinese Community Party (CCP) since its creation in 1949.⁷¹ Since then, the state has clearly placed its focus on establishing a firm hold over three main pillars: “control of personnel, propaganda, and the People’s Liberation Army”.⁷² While the significant efforts directed towards controlling these three pillars have shaped the day-to-day functionality of the Chinese domestic politics, it has arguably distorted the party’s view on how to effectively cultivate respect in the international community. However, can the party’s long-standing domestic agenda be solely to blame for what appears to be increasingly aggressive offensive actions taken in the international community on behalf of the Chinese state?

⁷⁰ Federal Bureau of Investigation, “The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party to the Economic and National Security of the United States,” Federal Bureau of Investigation (Federal Bureau of Investigation, July 7, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-posed-by-the-chinese-government-and-the-chinese-communist-party-to-the-economic-and-national-security-of-the-united-states.

⁷¹ The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, “Chinese Communist Party | Political Party, China,” in Encyclopedia Britannica, July 18, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chinese-Communist-Party.

⁷² Eleanor Albert, Beina Xu, and Lindsay Maizland, “The Chinese Communist Party,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, June 9, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinese-communist-party.

China’s Growing Admiration Towards Russia

Over the course of the past five years, we have seen evidence that suggests a growing willingness of the Chinese government to exert overt and covert influence over territories that share a special relationship with the mainland, such as Taiwan and Hong Kong. Leading up to these questionable cases there has been both a rise in Russian disinformation campaigns and information warfare toward the Western world and a continued rapid development in relations between the Russian government and the Chinese government. As noted by Chinese President, Xi Jinping, ahead of a visit to Russia in July of 2019, “I have had closer interactions with President Putin than with any other foreign colleagues. He is my best and bosom friend. I cherish dearly our deep friendship.”⁷³ Recently, the two countries have conducted several joint military training exercises with the most recent taking place in September of 2020 in southern Russia, just weeks before the U.S. Presidential Election and during the midst of the growing global pandemic.⁷⁴ The strengthening of the Chinese and Russian relationship has brought about several notable concerns from political figures and academics alike, which can be captured by the remarks of Thomas Joscelyn of the Foundation for Defense of Democracy, “the Xi-Putin partnership is arguably the most dangerous relationship on the planet today.”⁷⁵

While at first glance it may appear that these two countries are focused on two different political agendas which could possibly limit a future need for international cooperation between the two states, this is not necessarily the case. If we draw our attention to the aspirations of these

⁷³ Global Times - Xinhua, “Xi Tells Russian Media He Cherishes Deep Friendship with Putin - Global Times,” www.globaltimes.cn (Global Times, June 5, 2019), https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1153186.shtml.

⁷⁴ CBS/AP, “China Says It Will Join Russian Military Exercises This Month along with Iran, Belarus and Others,” Www.Cbsnews.Com, September 10, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-russia-military-exercises-war-games-caucasus-2020-with-iran-belarus-pakistan-myanmar/.

⁷⁵ Doug Bandow, “Why America Should Fear a Russia-China Alliance,” CATO Institute (CATO Institute, September 9, 2020), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-america-should-fear-russia-china-alliance.

two superpowers when it comes to 21st-century foreign affairs, we can identify a mutual desire to diminish the standing of the United States in hopes of restoring the previously held respect among their given geopolitical spheres of influence. As identified within the Secretary of Defense’s annual report to Congress on the military and security developments of the People’s Republic of China (PRC’s), it is stated that PRC has set forth a strategy that is focused on “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049.⁷⁶ One of the ways that the state has recently evolved to achieve this ambitious goal is by the adoption and aggressive implementation of a “sharp power” approach, a term which has been coined by the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies.⁷⁷ This term can be defined as, “an approach to international affairs that typically involves efforts at censorship and the use of manipulation to degrade the integrity of independent institutions.”⁷⁸ While the CPP has managed to assert its influence over the flow of information domestically, it now seeks to aggressively expand its state-led censorship and manipulative disinformation capabilities to the international community, similar to Russia. In doing so, the CCP aims to condition the minds of foreign entities into accepting the altered narrative that originates from the party leadership in Beijing.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Office of the Secretary of Defense, “OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China i,” U.S. Department of Defense (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2020), https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF.

⁷⁷ Christopher Walker, “China’s Foreign Influence and Sharp Power Strategy to Shape and Influence Democratic Institutions,” National Endowment for Democracy (National Endowment for Democracy, May 16, 2016), https://www.ned.org/chinas-foreign-influence-and-sharp-power-strategyto-shape-and-influence-democratic-institutions/.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, “OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China i,” U.S. Department of Defense (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2020), https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF.

With control over the foreign perspective and the financial means to influence global markets, the PRC has begun to establish itself as a global leader.⁸⁰

However, the PRC realizes that in order to advance its desired standing within the international community, it must further destabilize the country that is currently limiting its ability to be seen as the top superpower, the United States. And in the year of a growing global pandemic and the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election, China has proven eager to jump at the opportunity to further expose an existing domestic vulnerability among the American people with the hopes of discrediting Western democracy, similar to Russia. However, the CCP’s approach differs from that of the Kremlin, as the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence has identified that China prefers the election of Democratic nominee and former Vice President Joe Biden, who offers a chance at moderating current Trump-backed criticisms against the PRC.⁸¹ While the CCP has made its presidential preferences clear, it can be argued that the PRC benefits from launching disinformation campaigns in support of, or against, both sides.⁸² As stated by a notable Chinese-American, Pastor Bob Fu, who recently has found himself facing death threats from supporters of the CCP, “With such a large-scale disinformation campaign, you don’t really have to think of this as beneficial to either candidate. The information operation is meant to cause confusion and chaos for the American electorate and hurt both

⁸⁰ Kathy Gilsinan, “How China Is Planning to Win Back the World,” The Atlantic, May 28, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/05/china-disinformation-propaganda-united-states-xi-jinping/612085/.

⁸¹ NCSC DIRECTOR WILLIAM EVANIA, “Statement by NCSC Director William Evanina: Election Threat Update for the American Public,” www.dni.gov (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, August 7, 2020), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/2139-statement-by-ncsc-director-william-evanina-election-threat-update-for-the-american-public.

⁸² Josh Rogin, “Opinion | There’s Chinese Interference on Both Sides of the 2020 Election,” Washington Post, October 29, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/theres-chinese-interference-on-both-sides-of-the-2020-election/2020/10/29/49f90dfe-1a2c-11eb-82db-60b15c874105_story.html.

sides.”⁸³ If this is indeed representative of the CCP’s strategy, it displays Beijing’s forward-thinking in shaping the future of great power politics.⁸⁴

China’s Disinformation Entities

In order to best understand the forms in which the PRC is implementing its sharp power approach, it is important to understand the state-backed entities that serve as the driving force behind domestic and international information campaigns. Similar to the Russian military’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU), the PRC has established the People’s Liberation Army’s Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF holds the Network Systems Department which is largely responsible for the PRC’s “cyberwarfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare” operations carried out against foreign entities.⁸⁵ It is worth noting that the SSF is the only known psychological warfare focused entity within the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA).⁸⁶ With this knowledge, the U.S. Department of Defense has defined the intent of the PLA’s psychological operations mission as one that aims to disrupt and influence the public narrative of the international community with the intent of advancing the interests of the PRC.⁸⁷

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Kathy Gilsinan, “How China Is Planning to Win Back the World,” The Atlantic, May 28, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/05/china-disinformation-propaganda-united-states-xi-jinping/612085/

⁸⁵ Office of the Secretary of Defense, “OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China i,” U.S. Department of Defense (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2020), https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

China and the Fight to Control Hong Kong

Considering the recent events that have taken place in Hong Kong in mid to late 2019, there is an apparent state-sponsored suppression of the citizens’ and reporters’ voices across several virtual domains. The unrest in Hong Kong began in June of 2019 as plans of an extradition bill came to light, which would allow for citizens of Hong Kong to be extradited to mainland China for legal prosecution.⁸⁸ Protesters feared that this would give China the ability to assert control over a semi-autonomous territory, which is currently identified as the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the PRC.⁸⁹ Following July 1, 1997, China was once again granted sovereignty over Hong Kong by the British after the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong.⁹⁰ However, in return for the PRC’s resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong, the PRC agreed to abide by the Basic Law which outlines the concept of ‘one country, two systems’ and provides a constitutional framework to preserve the freedoms of Hong Kong’s governing body and its people.⁹¹ However, in light of recent events, the people of Hong Kong feel that the mainland is trying to exercise unlawful influence over its unique system.

These fears had motivated hundreds of thousands of citizens to take to the streets of Hong Kong. After weeks of unrest, Hong Kong’s legislature had decided to officially withdraw the highly debated extradition bill.⁹² However, citizens continued to take to the streets with the “five

⁸⁸ BBC Editor, “The Hong Kong Protests Explained in 100 and 500 Words,” BBC News, November 28, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49317695.

⁸⁹ Ibid. ; People Republic of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” www.fmprc.gov.cn (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ljzg_665465/zgjk_665467/3572_665469/t17814.shtml.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹ GovHK, “GovHK: Fact Sheets,”* www.gov.hk* (GovHK, July 2020), https://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/.

⁹² BBC Editor, “Hong Kong Formally Scraps Extradition Bill That Sparked Protests,” BBC News, October 23, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50150853.

demands, not one less” campaign that aimed to promote further pro-democratic reform within the HKSAR.⁹³ After several violent clashes between protesters and law enforcement, Yang Guang, a spokesman for the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the Chinese government, promoted the protestors as “brazen, violent and criminal actors”.⁹⁴ Which was then followed by an implicit verbal warning from Beijing that urged protestors to not underestimate the strength and power of the central government.⁹⁵

With the hopes of controlling the narrative of events unfolding in the HKSAR, the PRC took an aggressive two-pronged disinformation approach that aimed to control the way in which the citizens within mainland China and the international community perceived the ongoing events. When it came time to execute this particular disinformation campaign domestically, it was executed with ease due to the fact that the party has blocked access to Twitter, Facebook, and Google for the mainland citizens of the PRC.⁹⁶ Consequently, the citizens are limited to the news that is shared on the state-backed platforms, Weibo, which is supposed to replicate a more censored version of Twitter, and WeChat, which is aimed at replicating a popularized Facebook application by the name of WhatsApp.⁹⁷ It is through these platforms that the CPP managed to launch several campaigns that villainized the HKSAR protestors and projected them as radical

⁹³ Amnesty International Editor, “Hong Kong Protests Explained,” Amnesty.org (Amnesty International, 2019), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/09/hong-kong-protests-explained/.

⁹⁴ Christy Choi, “Hong Kong Protesters and Chinese Officials Hold Rival Press Conferences,” The Guardian (The Guardian, August 6, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/06/masked-hong-kongers-democracy-china-thugs.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Arjun Kharpal, “An App That Let Chinese Users Bypass the Great Firewall and Access Google, Facebook Has Disappeared,” CNBC (CNBC, October 11, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/12/chinese-app-that-let-users-access-google-facebook-has-disappeared.html.

⁹⁷ BBC Editor, “Social Media and Censorship in China: How Is It Different to the West?,” Bbc.co.uk (BBC News, September 26, 2017), http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/41398423/social-media-and-censorship-in-china-how-is-it-different-to-the-west.

separatists who aimed to degrade the unity of the PRC.⁹⁸ One of the more notable discussion threads on Weibo was titled “Protect Hong Kong, firmly say no to violence” and this thread managed to accumulate over one million comments that largely backed state intervention against protestors in the HKSAR.⁹⁹

However, the PRC aimed to control narrative beyond the state and in order to accomplish this, it became clear that these disinformation campaigns would have to be replicated across Western social media platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook. After careful investigation, Twitter had reported in an official statement that it had suspended approximately 200,000 accounts that, “ … were deliberately and specifically attempting to sow political discord in Hong Kong, including undermining the legitimacy… of the protest on the ground.”¹⁰⁰ Of these approximately 200,000 Twitter accounts, a minimum of 936 of them had originated from the PRC and others likely accessed the platform through VPNs.¹⁰¹ Additionally, Facebook had reported in an official statement that it had removed 5 Facebook accounts, 3 Facebook Groups, and 7 Facebook Pages from the platform due to the posting of disinformation on matters relating to Hong Kong and origins that traced back to PRC government officials.¹⁰² Facebook estimates that these Facebook Pages had roughly a combined total of 15,000 followers and that the Facebook Groups had a combined total of 2,200 joiners.¹⁰³

In one final push to control the narrative stemming from events in Hong Kong, the top legislature in China had enacted a new national security law for the HKSAR in July of 2020,

⁹⁸ Lily Kuo, “Beijing’s New Weapon to Muffle Hong Kong Protests: Fake News,” The Guardian (The Guardian, August 11, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/11/hong-kong-china-unrest-beijing-media-response.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Twitter Safety, “Information Operations Directed at Hong Kong,” blog.twitter.com (Twitter, August 19, 2019), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/information_operations_directed_at_Hong_Kong.html.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Nathaniel Gleicher, “Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior From China,” About Facebook (Facebook, August 19, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/08/removing-cib-china/.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

which outlined new guidance for the interpretation and punishments of crimes that can be classified under “secession”, “subversion”, “terrorism” and “collusion with foreign forces.”¹⁰⁴ The new national security law placed on the HKSAR comes at a time of uncertainty as clashes between protestors and state police forces continue to rage on in the city.¹⁰⁵ In the eyes of Jeff Wasserstrom, a historian of modern China at the University of California, Irvine, this move further endangers the sovereignty of the territory, as police forces have been presented with an even greater degree of autonomy to move forward with unlawful arrests of those who speak out against the PRC and CPP.¹⁰⁶ Consequently, it can be predicted that this will only further limit the freedom of speech of citizens across verbal and electronic mediums due to an increased fear of repercussion for voicing personal views. In response to the passing of this legislation, President Trump signed Executive Order 13936 which authorized the U.S. Government to impose sanctions on those responsible within PRC for passing the national security law, as this act has been perceived as a threat to the autonomy of the HKSAR and the national security of the United States.¹⁰⁷

Chinese Disinformation During a Global Pandemic

The widespread disinformation campaigns as seen within the cases of Hong Kong (HKSAR) and Taiwan serve as an alarming glimpse into the advancing capabilities of the PRC and arguably offer a grim warning to those who sit in the crosshairs of the party, such as the United States. As we find ourselves amidst a growing global pandemic, we have seen the rapid

¹⁰⁴ Anthony Kwan / Stringer, “Hong Kong’s National Security Law: 10 Things You Need to Know,” www.amnesty.org (Amnesty International, July 17, 2020), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/hong-kong-national-security-law-10-things-you-need-to-know/.

¹⁰⁵ William Yang, “How China’s Influence Is Changing Hong Kong Protests | DW | 07.09.2020,” DW.COM (DW, July 9, 2020), https://www.dw.com/en/chinas-influence-changing-hong-kong-protests/a-54842597.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Susan V. Lawrence and Michael F. Martin, “China’s National Security Law for Hong Kong: Issues for Congress” (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 3, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R46473.pdf.

degradation of international relations, with respect to China, due to a lack of transparency and truth surrounding the origins and reporting of COVID-19.¹⁰⁸

Beginning in December, several Chinese doctors had begun to notice a strange occurrence of a virus that appeared similar to the earlier outbreak of the SARS-coronavirus epidemic, one of which was Doctor Li Wenliang.¹⁰⁹ As Dr. Li’s worries began to grow, he attempted to share precautionary measures with fellow medical professionals.¹¹⁰ However, as word of this reached government officials, an official investigation was launched and Dr. Li was forced to sign a note that urged him to stop spreading false claims with an explicit threat of legal repercussion if these demands were not immediately enacted.¹¹¹ After several weeks, Dr. Li had fallen ill and passed away from complications caused by COVID-19, the virus that he had originally identified weeks prior.¹¹² However, prior to his unfortunate passing, Dr. Li had taken to the Chinese social media platform, Weibo, to share his story and further prove that the CCP had falsely denied any spread of infection across its state-monitored media platforms.¹¹³

Additionally, in January of 2020, China purposely withheld and prohibited the disclosure of data pertaining to COVID-19 to the World Health Organization (WHO) and instead held an abundance of closed door political meetings.¹¹⁴Dr. Gauden Galea, the WHO’s highest-ranking

¹⁰⁸ Jamie P. Horsley, “Let’s End the COVID-19 Blame Game: Reconsidering China’s Role in the Pandemic,” ed. James Haynes, Brookings (Brookings, August 19, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/08/19/lets-end-the-covid-19-blame-game-reconsidering-chinas-role-in-the-pandemic/.

¹⁰⁹ Nicholas Kristof, “Opinion | ‘I Cannot Remain Silent,’” The New York Times, February 15, 2020, sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/15/opinion/sunday/china-coronavirus.html.

¹¹⁰ Stephanie Hegarty, “The Chinese Doctor Who Tried to Warn Others about Coronavirus,” BBC News, February 6, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-51364382.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Jamie P. Horsley, “Let’s End the COVID-19 Blame Game: Reconsidering China’s Role in the Pandemic,” ed. James Haynes, Brookings (Brookings, August 19, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/08/19/lets-end-the-covid-19-blame-game-reconsidering-chinas-role-in-the-pandemic/.

official in China, reported that “… they’re [the Chinese Government] giving it to us 15 minutes before it appears on CCTV.”¹¹⁵

And after weeks of developing widespread cases of COVID-19, a top Chinese official, and Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian had made the first notable attempt at deflecting responsibility for COVID-19’s proven origins in Wuhan, China.¹¹⁶ Within a tweet, Zhao Lijian, had raised suspicion to his more than 300,000 followers that the virus may have been brought into China from a U.S. Soldier.¹¹⁷ These false claims were quickly followed by an aggressive push back by President Trump, who notably referred to COVID-19 as the ‘Chinese virus’ across several press briefings and tweets.¹¹⁸ However, the efforts to rewrite the narrative of pandemic proved to be more widespread than the theory promoted by Zhao Lijian, as they continued to unfold. The Chinese government has chosen to clearly follow the Russian strategy of disinformation by attempting to confuse the general public by promoting differing theories across social media platforms and by utilizing state-backed accounts and figures to promote these messages to hundreds of thousands of users across the world.¹¹⁹

Beginning in late 2018, there had been only 17 official Chinese diplomatic Twitter accounts across the platform but as of early 2020, there had been a sudden 370% growth in this number,

¹¹⁵ The Associated Press, “China Delayed Releasing Coronavirus Info, Frustrating WHO,” AP NEWS (The Associated Press, June 2, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/3c061794970661042b18d5aeaaed9fae.

¹¹⁶ Ben Westcott Westcott and Steven Jiang, “Chinese Diplomat Promotes Coronavirus Conspiracy Theory,” CNN (CNN, March 13, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/13/asia/china-coronavirus-us-lijian-zhao-intl-hnk/index.html. ; Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham, “Where Did COVID-19 Really Come From?,” Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, July 28, 2020), https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/covid19-origin/.

¹¹⁷ Ben Westcott Westcott and Steven Jiang, “Chinese Diplomat Promotes Coronavirus Conspiracy Theory,” CNN (CNN, March 13, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/13/asia/china-coronavirus-us-lijian-zhao-intl-hnk/index.html.

¹¹⁸ Lily Kuo, “Trump Sparks Anger by Calling Coronavirus the ‘Chinese Virus,’” The Guardian, March 17, 2020, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/17/trump-calls-covid-19-the-chinese-virus-as-rift-with-coronavirus-beijing-escalates.

¹¹⁹ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “China Adopts Russia’s Disinformation Playbook,” Axios (Axios, March 25, 2020), https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-china-russia-disinformation-playbook-c49b6f3b-2a9a-47c1-9065-240121c9ceb2.html.

marking over 80 official Chinese diplomatic accounts on the platform.¹²⁰ Evidence suggests that there could be a correlation in this sudden sharp growth to a meeting held on February 3rd, 2020 by Chinese President, Xi Jinping.¹²¹ It had been reported that one of the major talking points within this meeting focused on crafting a strategy for publicizing a narrative that highlighted the state’s unity in the face of the growing pandemic.¹²² In the months following this meeting, Twitter experienced a surge in accounts that aimed to spread pro-Chinese disinformation across the platform and this consequently led to an investigation that successfully identified over 23,750 highly engaged state-backed accounts that were responsible for collectively tweeting 348,608 times.¹²³

Additionally, U.S. officials have recently grown aware that the PRC has unforeseen capabilities that allow for its reach to expand beyond the means of social media as frequently seen in past years.¹²⁴ During the early onset of the pandemic, the U.S. Intelligence Community had successfully identified that PRC operatives were behind an SMS disinformation campaign.¹²⁵ This campaign targeted a large population of the American public with exaggerated messages of a potential nationwide lockdown that would be enforced by the U.S. military.¹²⁶ While the exact reach of this campaign remains unreported, it appeared to be widespread enough to invoke a

¹²⁰ The Economist, “China Finds a Use Abroad for Twitter, a Medium It Fears at Home,” The Economist (The Economist, February 20, 2020), https://www.economist.com/china/2020/02/20/china-finds-a-use-abroad-for-twitter-a-medium-it-fears-at-home.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Donie O’Sullivan, “Twitter Deletes over 170,000 Accounts Linked to the Chinese Government,” CNN (CNN, June 12, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/11/tech/twitter-manipulation-account-removal/index.html.

¹²⁴ Edward Wong, Matthew Rosenberg, and Julian E. Barnes, “Chinese Agents Helped Spread Messages That Sowed Virus Panic in U.S., Officials Say,” The New York Times, April 22, 2020, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/politics/coronavirus-china-disinformation.html.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

statement refuting the false claims by the White House National Security Council via Twitter on March 15, 2020.¹²⁷

As clearly stated by Xu Zhangrun, a law professor in Beijing, “The coronavirus epidemic has revealed the rotten core of Chinese governance.”¹²⁸ The paper which outlines the criticism of the party posed by Xu, has since been banned but continues to circulate around the state through back-channel means.¹²⁹ Additionally, the disinformation surrounding the origins of COVID-19 has led more and more political scholars to grow increasingly skeptical over the means by which the Xi regime presides over the Chinese people, with most supporting the harsh criticisms of the party for recent actions and injustices.¹³⁰ As stated by Shadi Hamid, a contributing writer at The Atlantic, “… this pandemic should, finally, disabuse us of any remaining hope that the Chinese regime could be a responsible global actor. It is not, and it will not become one.”¹³¹

China’s Growing Focus on American Politics

Concurrently, as the international community faces growing uncertainty surrounding COVID-19, it is believed that the risk of foreign interference in the 2020 U.S. Presidential election remains heightened. And as the U.S. approached the 100-day countdown leading up to November 3rd, U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center Director, William Evanina, issued a statement regarding the Intelligence Community’s commitment to updating the

¹²⁷ Aaron Holmes, “Fake Text Messages Claiming the US Military Would Enforce a Country-Wide Lockdown Went Viral Last Month. They Were Spread by Chinese Agents, According to a New Report.,” Business Insider, April 22, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/covid-19-lockdown-text-messages-hoax-spread-by-china-report-2020-4.

¹²⁸ Nicholas Kristof, “Opinion | ‘I Cannot Remain Silent,’” The New York Times, February 15, 2020, sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/15/opinion/sunday/china-coronavirus.html.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Shadi Hamid, “China Is Avoiding Blame by Trolling the World,” The Atlantic (The Atlantic, March 19, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/china-trolling-world-and-avoiding-blame/608332/.

¹³¹ Ibid.

American people of any existing foreign threats ahead of election night.¹³² It was within this statement that Director Evanina explicitly identified that the PRC has taken an invested interest in shifting their disinformation efforts towards the American people in the months leading up to the U.S. Presidential election.¹³³ It was approximately three weeks later that Director Evanina went on record once again to reaffirm the strong belief that, “China has been expanding its influence efforts ahead of November 2020 to shape the policy environment in the United States, pressure political figures it views as opposed to China’s interests, and deflect and counter-criticism of China.”¹³⁴

Reports show that there have already been several attempts made to access information and spread disinformation on behalf of the PRC, ahead of Election Day 2020. In early September of 2020, Google released statements on a Chinese hackers’ attempt to access the personal email accounts of the Biden Campaign on multiple levels.¹³⁵ Later in the same month, Facebook wrote in a blog post that it ceased the continuation of an early stage disinformation campaign launched by the Chinese in an attempt to influence the political views of American citizens.¹³⁶ While at the current moment, evidence supporting this belief is limited due to the timing and the sensitive nature of intelligence gathering efforts leading up to the 2020 Presidential election, it is

¹³² NCSC Director William Evanina, “Statement by NCSC Director William Evanina: 100 Days Until Election 2020,” www.dni.gov (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, July 24, 2020), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/2135-statement-by-ncsc-director-william-evanina-100-days-until-election-2020.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ NCSC DIRECTOR WILLIAM EVANIA, “Statement by NCSC Director William Evanina: Election Threat Update for the American Public,” www.dni.gov (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, August 7, 2020), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/2139-statement-by-ncsc-director-william-evanina-election-threat-update-for-the-american-public.

¹³⁵ David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “Chinese Hackers Target Email Accounts of Biden Campaign Staff, Google Says,” The New York Times, June 4, 2020, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/us/politics/china-joe-biden-hackers.html.

¹³⁶ Nathaniel Gleicher, “Removing Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior,” Facebook.com (Facebook, September 22, 2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/09/removing-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-china-philippines/

imperative that we as a country identify the developing threat posed by the PRC and face it head-on with the full support of the international community.

These beliefs have since been echoed by not only top U.S. Intelligence Officials but also by the Intelligence Chief of the British Domestic Security Service (MI5), Ken McCallum.¹³⁷ It was during Chief McCallum’s first media briefing that he analyzed the Russian and Chinese backed disinformation efforts as, “ … Russia was like bad weather but China [is] a far greater challenge in the long-term and more like climate change.”¹³⁸ While the level of threat posed by the PRC may remain unclear, it is apparent that the narrative posed by the U.S. government has appeared to be reciprocated by some of our notable allies across the globe, such as Britain.

¹³⁷ Olivia Solon and Ken Dilanian, “China’s Influence Operations Offer Glimpse into Information Warfare’s Future,” NBC News (NBC News, October 21, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/china-s-influence-operations-offer-glimpse-future-information-warfare-n1244065.

¹³⁸ The Standard, “New UK Intel Chief Likens China Threat to Climate Change, While Russia Is Bad Weather,” The Standard (The Standard Newspapers Publishing Ltd., October 15, 2020), https://www.thestandard.com.hk/breaking-news/section/6/157484/New-UK-intel-chief-likens-China-threat-to-climate-change.